On 11 February 2014 15:59, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 2/10/2014 5:35 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 11 February 2014 13:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>  On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against step 3?
>> Then I invite you to attempt to explain it to us.
>>
>>
>>
>> I think I understand it.  Asking the question "which will you be" in the
>> MW experiment is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated.
>>
>>
>>  But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The
>> question asked is about your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-your future.
>> It cannot be ambiguous when we assume comp.
>>
>>  Sure it is.  What does "your first person expectation" refer to.  Does
>> it ask what will your 1-p experience be?  Or does it ask what is your 1-p
>> feeling about where you will be?
>>
>
>  Consider a quantum measurement instead. Do we have an expectation of 1p
> experience when we check if a photon's been reflected or transmitted? We
> assign a probability to each outcome, surely? Why is Bruno's duplicator
> different?
>
>  There are two different people you can ask, "How did the experiment come
> out."
>

Well, likewise with the quantum version. In fact there are two versions of
you who can ask them (i.e. if you accept the MWI, what's the problem?)

  (We seem to have been around in a loop on this about 100 times...)

 I agree and I'm willing to take it as hypothetical that it doesn't make a
> difference, at least till I understand the whole argument.  But I suspect
> that it could.  It might require that in step a whole world be created and
> that I think could make a difference.
>

The point is that if we take the assumptions of comp, then quantum
duplication, hypothetical matter transmitter duplication, and living from
day to day ALL involve the same amount of (or lack of) continuity.

In other words, all types of existence appear to be equally "Heraclitean"
and I'm not sure why Bruno's thought experiment should be treated any
differently to the nonduplicated and the quantum-duplicated versions. He's
just using it to point out the somewhat disjointed nature of normal
existence by putting it into a hypothetical situation where we can more
easily think about the consequences.

It's all very well having reservations that X might make a difference, but
as Bruno keeps saying, show him where he's gone wrong so he can stop
worrying about comp and spend his time keeping bees instead!

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