On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: > > On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in > > > the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of > > > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's > > > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the > > > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious > > > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. > That's > > > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of > arithmetic?) > > > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another > way, > > > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation > simulate > > > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to > > > that world. > > > > > > > Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial > > assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! > > > > I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial > computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual > senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated > reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. > > I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. > > Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?). However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic) consciousness *of* an external world" is simply an opinion, and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from incredulity". -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
