On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical
realism in
> > the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness
depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about
Peano's
> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are
obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be
ineffable. That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of
arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'
computation simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist
*relative* to
> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the
initial
> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was
rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?).
However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic)
consciousness *of* an external world" is simply an opinion,
Is it? Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?
Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all
digital approximation of all physical universe, (and the real physical
universe is a non Turing emulable sum on all those computations), so
arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be conscious of.
and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from
incredulity".
Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge"
Arithmetic provability CANNOT model knowledge at all. Gödel saw this
in 1933(*)
(*) GÖDEL K., 1933, Eine Interpretation des Intuitionistischen
Aussagenkalküls, Ergebnisse
eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums, Vol 4, pp. 39-40, also in FEFERMAN &
Al. 1986.
That is the starting point of AUDA.
and "unprovable arithmetical truth" = "qualia". Are you credulous
on those two points?
It does not make sense, and I insist on this. G* is not a logic of
qualia. You need the intensional nuances.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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