On 2/11/2014 7:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 14:43, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
    On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
        > On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]
        <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
        >
        > > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical 
realism in
        > > the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness 
depends of
        > > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
        > > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
        > > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are 
obvious
        > > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.  
That's
        > > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of 
arithmetic?)
        > > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at 
another way,
        > > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation 
simulate
        > > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist 
*relative* to
        > > that world.
        > >
        >
        > Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
        > assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
        >

        I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
        computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
        senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
        reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

        I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

    Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was rejecting, or 
the
    Peano subset thereof I think?).

    However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic) consciousness 
*of* an
    external world" is simply an opinion,
    Is it?  Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?


Not without being conscious of something, no, but you specified an external world. Dreaming is arguably a case where you aren't conscious of an external world.

Not directly, but then it's never *directly*. I think dreams are about the world too, about concepts and events you learned or which were hardwired into your brain by evolution.

and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from incredulity".

    Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge" and 
"unprovable
    arithmetical truth" = "qualia".  Are you credulous on those two points?


I'm agnostic, at least pending (a lot of) further investigation. But it sounded to me as though you were incredulous that "dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world". i.e. the whole "UDA being able to exist in Platonia" thing.

I'm not sure they are impossible. If you wrote a theorem proving, Lobian program then maybe it would dream arithmetic. But I'm very doubtful that is the source of human dreams.

Brent


Which I have to admit seems a fairly incredible idea to me most of the time, especially when I stub my toe.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to