On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
> > the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another
way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation
simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was rejecting, or the Peano
subset thereof I think?).
However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic) consciousness *of* an
external world" is simply an opinion,
Is it? Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?
and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from incredulity".
Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge" and "unprovable
arithmetical truth" = "qualia". Are you credulous on those two points?
Brent
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