On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
<mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>
> > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
> > the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of
> > consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
> > arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
> > "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious
> > physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
That's
> > why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
> > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another
way,
> > I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation
simulate
> > a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
> > that world.
> >
>
> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
>
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was rejecting, or the Peano
subset thereof I think?).
However, I agree that "I think consciousness depends of (sic) consciousness *of* an
external world" is simply an opinion,
Is it? Can you be conscious without being conscious of something?
and the other related objections seem to be "arguing from incredulity".
Yes, I am incredulous that "arithmetical provability" = "knowledge" and "unprovable
arithmetical truth" = "qualia". Are you credulous on those two points?
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
