2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: >> >>> On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in >>>> the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of >>>> consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's >>>> arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the >>>> "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious >>>> physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. >>>> That's >>>> why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) >>>> are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another >>>> way, >>>> I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation >>>> simulate >>>> a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to >>>> that world. >>>> >>>> >>> Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial >>> assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! >>> >>> >> I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial >> computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual >> senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated >> reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. >> >> I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. >> >> I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I >> still >> don't feel I fully understand what that says yet. >> > > At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist > form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and > arithmetic (or number theology). > > Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some > non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that > primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the primitive > materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean by primitive > matter,
It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real... only computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would be false, a mathematical statement not implemented in matter is indeterminate, the truth value only come from implementation. Computationalism + realness ingredient could still be possible and evade UDA conclusion... at the costs of some "magical" property. Quentin > and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties. > But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a > refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself. > > To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if > most are OK, with the steps 0-7. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
