On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2014 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical
realism in
the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about
Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be
ineffable. That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist
*relative* to
that world.
Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the
initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not,
as I still
don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.
At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).
Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties
in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness.
I think the only non FPI property we have to invoke is that
somethings exist and some don't.
That is the same error as Craig and Edgar: it consists in taking
reality as the explanation of reality.
But the whole UDA consists in showing that if you take comp seriously
enough, this makes no sense at all.
Now, you were cautious and said that you *think* that .... I suggest
we progress, and I can only hope that you will grasp why we cannot do
that (if we are interested in the mind-body problem, as we don't need
that to find bosons, or go on Mars).
Bruno
Brent
It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to
define what they mean by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such
matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot
be a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.
To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But
only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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