On 2/12/2014 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in
the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to
that world.
Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!
I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.
I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.
I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still
don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.
At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of
ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number
theology).
Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some non Turing
emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that primitive matter to
instantiate consciousness.
I think the only non FPI property we have to invoke is that somethings exist
and some don't.
Brent
It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean
by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable
properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a refutation of
comp->reversal, but of comp itself.
To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if most are OK,
with the steps 0-7.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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