On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18/02/2014, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: >> >> >> I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I >> >> should also say that life is. >> > >> > >> > And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of >> > physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of .... well, something that is >> > not >> > itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems >> > to >> > tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be >> > considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot >> > possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment >> > that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of >> > those >> > appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, >> > but >> > do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? >> >> I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to >> consciousness >> >> >> Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. >> >> >> >> then I don't think this is any different to the situation where >> biochemistry necessarily leads to life. >> >> >> Ah! >> But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an >> epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is "only" a 1p phenomenon, but it can >> make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). >> >> Bruno > > > Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination. > > > What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do > differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer > which does not enter in the telebox. > I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. > Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different logic. > And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are > equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a > requirement to remain consistent.
That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. The essentially different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how you feel by *being* you, or so it goes. > It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is "no more" than the biochemistry, > > > Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in biochemistry, but > is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue chess > abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it. Life and > chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are* implemented by > infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the problem of > justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on > arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from. > To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but if taken > too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that biochemistry is no > more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than > reduction and application of combinators. Yes, that's what I would say that life and biochemistry are if a TOE can generate all of reality from something basic. > but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would > intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well. > > > Are you not doing "Searle" error? A person can simulate the chinese person > does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person feeling. > Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does not entail > that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove. And all > the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or imitation, > even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this > important point in the modal thread. > You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to > computationalism). Yes, you can simulate something without really understanding it, like the Chinese Room. But maybe if we had godlike cognitive abilities we could simulate another mind and literally see things from their point of view. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
