On 22 Feb 2014, at 06:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18/02/2014, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of
biochemistry I
should also say that life is.
And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an
epiphenomenon of
physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of .... well, something
that is
not
itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem
seems
to
tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should
strictly be
considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that
cannot
possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no
entailment
that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of
those
appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the
way,
but
do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say?
I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily
leads to
consciousness
Biochemistry or anything Turing universal.
then I don't think this is any different to the situation where
biochemistry necessarily leads to life.
Ah!
But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make
consciousness an
epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is "only" a 1p phenomenon,
but it can
make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor).
Bruno
Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination.
What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do
differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the
observer
which does not enter in the telebox.
I am not sure what sense to give to your statement.
Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different
logic.
And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are
equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination,
it is a
requirement to remain consistent.
That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only
M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon.
Yes. That is why there is nothing controversial in the FPI, as it
needs only a very crude 3p definition of 1p, illustrated with personal
memories or diaries accompanying the experiencer in the telebox.
The essentially
different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary,
but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how
you feel by *being* you, or so it goes.
Yes. But distinguishing 1p and 3p, by outside/inside a teleportation
box already gives the gist why we cannot experience the private
experience of someone else, as the threads "WWMM..." will be
particular for each individual, even for a consciousness eliminativist.
Two observers get entangled, and share the same indeterminacies, when
going both in the same telebox. That's the first person plural.
It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is "no more" than the
biochemistry,
Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in
biochemistry, but
is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue
chess
abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it.
Life and
chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are*
implemented by
infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the
problem of
justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on
arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from.
To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but
if taken
too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that
biochemistry is no
more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than
reduction and application of combinators.
Yes, that's what I would say that life and biochemistry are if a TOE
can generate all of reality from something basic.
OK. Normally, UDA shows already that if comp is correct such a TOE
*has to* to be like that. I think.
but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would
intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well.
Are you not doing "Searle" error? A person can simulate the
chinese person
does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person
feeling.
Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does
not entail
that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove.
And all
the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or
imitation,
even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this
important point in the modal thread.
You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to
computationalism).
Yes, you can simulate something without really understanding it,
That is a key point. It is what Searle miss in the "chinese room".
Later, I will have to explain that Robinson Arithmetic can and do
imitate all Löbian machines (like PA, ZF, and you, and me), despite RA
is not Löbian.
like
the Chinese Room.
Ah! (I should read the whole sentence ...).
But maybe if we had godlike cognitive abilities we
could simulate another mind and literally see things from their point
of view.
This raises an interesting question. Does it make sense for a machine
to have a godlike continuation?
Should we take those continuations into account in the FPI on
arithmetic? After all, the arithmetical truth can be shown to contain
or define infinities of such "non Turing emulable" entities. Most have
the exact same "provability logic" (G and G* is correct and complete
for them), but not all, some need the axiom G + supplementary axioms.
That might play some role in the comp "afterlife" question. Apparently
we need to go very close the "one" to lost Löbianity.
If that make sense, we might been able to wake up, and realize we were
different people in some simultaneous sense, a bit like in Jouvet
studies of dream accounts made by some people, who remember having
done two dreams simultaneously.
Jouvet explains this by assuming that the corpus callosum can be
sleepy and let two different dreams been proceeded by the two
hemispheres (even if based on the same triggering from the cerebral
stem---but "interpreted" differently by each hemisphere)).
Chris Peck alluded (in summer) to something like that to question the
P=1/2 in the duplication experience: the fact that we might later fuse
in some coherent way the two 1p experiences (of being in M and in W).
I don't find any inconsistency in such procedure, but they do not
invalidate the existence of the comp indeterminacy, which concerns the
1p happening just after we push on the button, and is independent of a
possible fusion later. In fact, after the fusion, the WM-guy will
indeed have a first person experience memory of the two mono-city
indeterminacies lived by each copy.
Now we can already have strong empathy for people "enough similar to
us", and a good novelist can help us in believing momentarily that we
see things from the point of view of the novel hero. This is never
entirely correct, of course, but that is what artist are aimed too, in
movie and books, probably through music and drawing too.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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