On 24 February 2014 12:43, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> John Searle in one of his papers proposes that if our brain were being >> gradually replaced we would find ourselves losing qualia while declaring >> that everything was normal, and being unable to make any protest to the >> contrary. This would imply that we think with something other than our >> brain, a soul equivalent, and that in certain situations the brain and this >> soul equivalent can become decoupled. >> > So he's either suggesting we'd lose them and be unable to articulate the > fact, or that we'd lose them and wouldn't know it..? > > The first one seems ridiculous. If we knew we were losing qualia, whatever > that would be like, surely we would be able to say so? Although I'm not sure > how one could lose qualia, what does that mean? Surely it isn't like the > artist in Oliver Sacks' book who lost the ability to see colours? He knew > he'd lost the ability even though he couldn't imagine what seeing colours > was like. So he knew he'd lost something, and could say so, but couldn't > bring to mind what the thing he'd lost was like. > > I don't really ujnderstand how one could lose qualia and not know it. Or is > the point that there's no longer anyone there to know it - a philosophical > zombie?
There is a condition called Anton's Syndrome in which some people who have lesions in their visual cortex are blind but do not recognise it. They make up excuses when asked why they didn't recognise someone or why they trip over things. It is a subtype of anosognosia, where the patient does not realise he has an illness; parietal neglect in stroke victims and lack of insight in schizophrenia are other examples. However, this is due to specific neurological deficits and is associated with abnormal behaviour as well as abnormal qualia. The point of this is that if the brain is responsible for consciousness it is absurd to suppose that the brain's behaviour could be replaced with a functional analogue while leaving out any associated qualia. This constitutes a proof of functionalism, and of its subset computationalism if it is further established that physics is computable. I don't think we have to settle for Bruno's modest assertion that comp is a matter of faith. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
