On 24 Feb 2014, at 06:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 24 February 2014 12:43, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
John Searle in one of his papers proposes that if our brain were
being
gradually replaced we would find ourselves losing qualia while
declaring
that everything was normal, and being unable to make any protest
to the
contrary. This would imply that we think with something other than
our
brain, a soul equivalent, and that in certain situations the brain
and this
soul equivalent can become decoupled.
So he's either suggesting we'd lose them and be unable to
articulate the
fact, or that we'd lose them and wouldn't know it..?
The first one seems ridiculous. If we knew we were losing qualia,
whatever
that would be like, surely we would be able to say so? Although I'm
not sure
how one could lose qualia, what does that mean? Surely it isn't
like the
artist in Oliver Sacks' book who lost the ability to see colours?
He knew
he'd lost the ability even though he couldn't imagine what seeing
colours
was like. So he knew he'd lost something, and could say so, but
couldn't
bring to mind what the thing he'd lost was like.
I don't really ujnderstand how one could lose qualia and not know
it. Or is
the point that there's no longer anyone there to know it - a
philosophical
zombie?
There is a condition called Anton's Syndrome in which some people who
have lesions in their visual cortex are blind but do not recognise it.
They make up excuses when asked why they didn't recognise someone or
why they trip over things. It is a subtype of anosognosia, where the
patient does not realise he has an illness; parietal neglect in stroke
victims and lack of insight in schizophrenia are other examples.
However, this is due to specific neurological deficits and is
associated with abnormal behaviour as well as abnormal qualia.
The point of this is that if the brain is responsible for
consciousness it is absurd to suppose that the brain's behaviour could
be replaced with a functional analogue while leaving out any
associated qualia. This constitutes a proof of functionalism, and of
its subset computationalism if it is further established that physics
is computable.
?
On the contrary if computationalism is correct the physics cannot be
entirely computable, some observable cannot be computed (but it might
be no more that the "frequency-operator", like in Graham Preskill. But
still, we must explain why physics seems computable, despite it result
of FMP on non computable domains).
Also,you are not using "functionalism" in its standard sense, which is
Putnam names for comp (at a non specified level assumed to be close to
neurons).
What do you mean by function? If you take all functions (like in set
theory), then it seems to me that functionalism is trivial, and the
relation between consciousness and a process, even natural, become
ambiguous.
But if you take all functions computable in some topos or category, of
computability on a ring, or that type of structure, then you *might*
get genuine generalization of comp.
I don't think we have to settle for Bruno's modest
assertion that comp is a matter of faith.
It has to be, from a theoretical point of view. Assuming you are
correct when betting on comp, you cannot prove, even to yourself (but
your 1p does not need that!) that you did survive a teleportation.
Of course I take "proof" in a rather strong literal sense. Non comp
might be consistent with comp, like "PA is inconsistent" is consistent
with PA.
Bruno
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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