On 3 March 2014 17:40, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> What if someone says that the function of the brain is to provide >> consciousness. Is that functionalism? >> What if someone says that the function of the brain is to link a "divine" >> soul to a person through a body? >> What is a function? > > No, a function is an observable pattern of behaviour. > > > You do use "function" in a non standard sense. > > > > > Functionalism says that if you replicate this, you also replicate the mind. > You need to replicate not only a special behaviour (which could be quite > easy) but all outputs for all inputs. > > > At all levels. Your functionalism is just what is called "mechanism". That > generalizes indeed "digital mechanism", that is comp. > It is not "functionalism" in the sense of philosopher of mind, where it > means computationalism, with a fuzzy fixed level.
OK then, mechanism. But I don't see why mechanism would *necessarily* be digital. Is it a contradiction to imagine a machine that is not Turing emulable? I don't mean here anything necessarily to do with consciousness, just a machine that does a particular physical task. >> That would be the case if consciousness were substrate-dependent. >> >> >> But you can put the substrate in the function. A brain would have the >> function to associate to that substrate the experience. How could I say no >> to the doctor who guaranties that all the function of the brain are >> preserved. >> The term function, like set, is too general, to much powerful. > > Then I'm using it in a somewhat precise sense as above. > > > Unfortunately, "observable pattern of behavior" is not that much precise. > "observable" is a complex epistemic notion for example. But I got it. By observable I mean only what you call 3p. The contention is that if the 3p behaviour is reproduced through whatever means, the 1p phenomenology will also be reproduced. I think this is consistent with the original meaning of functionalism, in particular the notion of multiple realisability. But the terminology doesn't really matter, and in fact sometimes gets in the way; it's better to be clear by saying exactly what you mean. >> It could also be that the behaviour cannot be reproduced by a computer >> because the substitution level requires non-computable physics (true >> randomness, real numbers, non-computable functions), but it could be >> reproduced by a non-computational device. So there are these possibilities >> with brain replacement: >> >> (a) the behaviour is not reproduced and neither is the consciousness; >> >> >> = ~ BEH-MEC >> >> >> (b) The behaviour is reproduced but the consciousness is not reproduced; >> >> >> ~ comp. >> >> >> >> (c) The behaviour is reproduced and so is the consciousness; >> >> >> = comp, unless it is the consciousness is the one by an impostor. >> >> >> >> (d) The behaviour is not reproduced but the consciousness is >> >> >> = "bad" substitution. >> >> >> >> >>>> What can be proved is that if consciousness is due to the brain then >>>> replicating brain function in some other substrate will also replicate >>>> its consciousness. >>> >>> >>> OK. What I meant is that we cannot prove that consciousness is due to the >>> brain. >> >> Yes, a dualist, for example, could consistently deny fuctionalism, >> >> >> Not sure. It depends on how you define function. >> >> >> >> but someone who believes that consciousness is due to the brain could not. >> >> >> Most dualist believes that consciousness is due to the brain. They will >> usually deny that the functional relation can be obtained with this or >> that >> type of functions, but to throw out all functions, makes their theory >> spurious. There will lost both interactionism and epiphenomenalism. >> >> Maybe you are on some idea, but you should take another word, as in >> philosophy of mind, functionalism is used for Putnam's computationalism. I >> do see vaguely what you mean, but it is still hard to define this >> precisely. >> It corresponds to the infinities of weakening comp, by adding oracle, or >> things like that. >> My old definition of comp was En (functionalism is true at level n), >> making >> functionalism à-la Putnam a restricted from of comp. Your terming is non >> standard and can lead to confusion, imo. You might use "mechanism" >> instead, >> with the idea that not all machines are digital indeed. > > I like this account of functionalism from the International Encyclopedia of > Philosophy: > > quote> > Consider, for example, mouse traps. Mouse traps are devices for catching or > killing mice. Mouse traps can be made of most any material, and perhaps > indefinitely or infinitely many designs could be employed. The most familiar > sort involves a wooden platform and a metal strike bar that is driven by a > coiled metal spring and can be released by a trigger. But there are mouse > traps designed with adhesives, boxes, poisons, and so on. All that matters > to something’s being a mouse trap, at the end of the day, is that it is > capable of catching or killing mice. > > Contrast mouse traps with diamonds. Diamonds are valued for their hardness, > their optical properties, and their rarity in nature. But not every hard, > transparent, white, rare crystal is a diamond—the most infamous alternative > being cubic zirconia. Diamonds are carbon crystals with specific molecular > lattice structures. Being a diamond is a matter of being a certain kind of > physical stuff. (That cubic zirconia is not quite as clear or hard as > diamonds explains something about why it is not equally valued. But even if > it were equally hard and equally clear, a CZ crystal would not thereby be a > diamond.) > > These examples can be used to explain the core idea of functionalism. > Functionalism is the theory that mental states are more like mouse traps > than they are like diamonds. > > > Hmm.... This is quite fuzzy and level dependent. > > > > That is, what makes something a mental state is more a matter of what it > does, not what it is made of. > > > OK. But then functionalism is just mechanism. > > > > > This distinguishes functionalism from traditional mind-body dualism, such as > that of René Descartes, according to which minds are made of a special kind > of substance, the res cogitans (the thinking substance.) > > > And here I think that Descartes abandoned that idea, but that's a bit beside > the topic. > > > > It also distinguishes functionalism from contemporary monisms such as J. J. > C. Smart’s mind-brain identity theory. The identity theory says that mental > states are particular kinds of biological states—namely, states of > brains—and so presumably have to be made of certain kinds of stuff, namely, > brain stuff. Mental states, according to the identity theory, are more like > diamonds than like mouse traps. Functionalism is also distinguished from B. > F. Skinner’s behaviorism because it accepts the reality of internal mental > states, rather than simply attributing psychological states to the whole > organism. According to behaviorism, which mental states a creature has > depends just on how it behaves (or is disposed to behave) in response to > stimuli. In contrast functionalists typically believe that internal and > psychological states can be distinguished with a “finer grain” than > behavior—that is, distinct internal or psychological states could result in > the same behaviors. So functionalists think that it is what the internal > states do that makes them mental states, not just what is done by the > creature of which they are parts. > <end quote > > > This is too much fuzzy. What is a "state" when we allow any functions? A > physical state? Physical state are all known to be Turing emulable. I think > that this quote defends comp implicitly, as it uses terms like "state" as > that was a simple notion, which it is, but only with comp. Your > functionalism is just mechanism. I think, with the option of being perhaps > non digital. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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