On 2/28/2014 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you start with the assumption that the physics relevant to brain
function is not computable then computationalism is false: it would be
impossible to make a machine that behaves like a human, either zombie
or conscious.
I agree with you, the physics *relevant* to brain function has to be computable, for
comp to be true. But the point is that below the substitution level, the physical
details are not relevant. Then by the FPI, they must be undetermined, and this on an
infinite non computable domain, and so, our "computable brain" must rely on a non
computable physics, or a non necessarily computable physics, with some non computable
aspect. This is what comp predicts, and of course this is confirmed by QM. Again,
eventually, QM might to much computable for comp to be true. That is what remain to be seen.
If you're going to invoke uncomputable physics at low level isn't that the same as
assuming inherent randomness at that low level?
Brent
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