On 28 Feb 2014, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/28/2014 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you start with the assumption that the physics relevant to brain
function is not computable then computationalism is false: it
would be
impossible to make a machine that behaves like a human, either
zombie
or conscious.
I agree with you, the physics *relevant* to brain function has to
be computable, for comp to be true. But the point is that below the
substitution level, the physical details are not relevant. Then by
the FPI, they must be undetermined, and this on an infinite non
computable domain, and so, our "computable brain" must rely on a
non computable physics, or a non necessarily computable physics,
with some non computable aspect. This is what comp predicts, and of
course this is confirmed by QM. Again, eventually, QM might to much
computable for comp to be true. That is what remain to be seen.
If you're going to invoke uncomputable physics at low level isn't
that the same as assuming inherent randomness at that low level?
It is a randomness or an indeterminacy, yes, but keep in mind that we
have to take into account the UD, or the arithmetical, very big and
important redundancy of the computations (notabluy below our
substitution level).
Post number (the halting number, that is
0.000110100000110101011110 ...., with i = 0 or 1 according to P_i
halting or not, with P_i the ith program without input), Post number
is not computable, but not completely random (it is compressible, and
his compression is the non compressible Chaitin number).
So, OK, it is random, but still compressible. In fact it is deep and
interesting in Bennet's technical sense. And then, that randomness is
not assumed here, but a consequence of the comp FPI.
Bruno
Brent
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