On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:> > >: > >> >> >> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >> >>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the >>>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here >>>> has >>>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way >>>> that >>>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was >>>> right?" >>> >>> >>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned >>> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree >>> that you were wrong and the world was right?" >>> >> >> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world >> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that >> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. >> >> >>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in >>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant >>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective >>> consequences for the patient. >>> >> >> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally >> substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of >> the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and >> subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some >> way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, >> but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question >> of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. >> >> >>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is >>> that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, >>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution >>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, >>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? >>> >> >> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake >> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that >> mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? >> Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a >> Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you >> can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a >> bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. >> >> > So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a > functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will > be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is > changed... that's what you mean ? > > So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process > and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would > that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? >
If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself which conjures something to be contained. Craig > > Quentin > > >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> David >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
