2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>: > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the >>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has >>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that >>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was >>> right?" >> >> >> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned >> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree >> that you were wrong and the world was right?" >> > > It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world > already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that > transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. > > >> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in >> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant >> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective >> consequences for the patient. >> > > Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally > substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of > the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and > subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some > way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, > but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question > of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. > > >> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is >> that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, >> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution >> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, >> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? >> > > Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal > on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that > a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it > mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls > if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can > never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of > modification without it being devalued significantly. > > So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is changed... that's what you mean ?
So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? Quentin > Craig > > >> >> David >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
