On 24 Feb 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:03:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe
the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which
computations are encountered.
My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is
counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I
propose that
1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
and
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-
acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be
pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of
how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated
from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that
an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a
hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data?
How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the
machine?
Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism
behind computation, I conclude that:
Your questions above are answered in computer science.
What makes the answers applicable beyond computer science?
God's will, if it applies, and God's will if it does not apply. I am
just saying that in the framework of a theory, your questions make
sense and get answered. You might appreciate or not that facts, but I
let you know.
I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the
notion of UD, and still ask how "numbers can encounter something".
Then a notion like "encounter" seems to assume many vague things.
But then you say it is just sense.
What does 'encounter' assume?
What do you mean by "encounter". I guess it assumes persons or things
and a relative locus to vibrate together in some ways. All that are
already complex notions, which themselves will require assumption.
I don't see a theory.
We have to go beyond theory to see sense, just as we have to wake up
to some degree to know that we were dreaming.
Yes, but not necessarily when we write post and try to communicate
something to others.
4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical
theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical
inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
?
Arithmetic does not examine its own origin, it assumes them from the
start.
But humans agree already on them. It is a good start, and then comp
justify entirely that we cannot assume less (or Turing equivalent).
6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii
fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro
level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro
level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid,
and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the
fallacy directly.
8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-
theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters
is the sole axiom.
You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special
terms.
If I am suggesting a solution that has not existed before, what term
could I use to refer to it that is not 'special'?
You have to described your finding in term than we can understand.
That is your job.
If you can't do that, you are just insulting, of spamming, the others
when insisting, or change the label of your type of prose.
9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science
can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to
reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-
subordinate.
We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense,
We don't need to grasp sense, we are sense, our lives are sensed.
In the 1p. But you can't infer from this that we grasp sense in the
1p-3p relation problem.
The point is that with comp that leads to a real concrete mathematical
problem. You theory says that's it, don't ask, don't try to theorize I
have it all.
Numbers are not easily grasp, and the vast majority of people alive
today and in human history have been almost mathematically illiterate.
Fake churches fear research.
and humans are known to fight on this since day one.
You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you
going to just talk with yourself.
That would seem to contradict the universality of mechanism. How is
a machine talking to itself different from agreeing to talk about
the same things with others? It seems like an argument for
conformity for the sake of conformity. Others can find ways to agree
with me too, you know...unless I am a machine that is made specially
different.
You confuse the universal machine when computer, and the universal
machine when the believer. the first one is universal in its ability
to imitate, but is not universal in the sense of its beliefs, which
are relative, notably on its actuals many states implementations in
arithmetic.
The universal machine is naturally a breaker of confirmity, even if it
can also be trapped in attachement to false or inconsistent beliefs,
for historical identity complex reasons.
10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation,
rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds
from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an
impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.
That is quite imprecise.
It's too compressed as a sentence, I agree. All I'm trying to say is
that machines can tell the truth about some aspects of subjectivity
and other parts of the cosmos also, but not because they have any
subjective experience.
That's your poor and sad prejudice.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
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