On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered.

My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that

1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre- mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.

My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine?

Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that:

Your questions above are answered in computer science. I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the notion of UD, and still ask how "numbers can encounter something".

Then a notion like "encounter" seems to assume many vague things. But then you say it is just sense.

I don't see a theory.




4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.

?



6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom.

You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special terms.

I will believe that you have a theory, when what you predict is invariant for the terming used.



9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- subordinate.

We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense, and humans are known to fight on this since day one. You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you going to just talk with yourself.



10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.

That is quite imprecise.

Bruno




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