Bruno, PS: I have no idea what you are asking in the following question. If you make it clear I'll try to respond....
"You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp")." Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > Craig, > > I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer > product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my > computational reality. > > > > But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does > your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any > (Turing) universal machine or numbers? > > Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any > mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical > implementation of a computation. > > > You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and > 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that > artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale > different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems > to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp"). > > Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. > > Bruno > > > > > :-) > > > > > > Edgar > > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> >>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >>> >> >> Computational Theory of Mind. >> >> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. >> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when >> I suspect that is neither. >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>> >>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>>> encountered. >>>> >>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>> counted >>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>> >>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and >>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>> >>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>> substrate, >>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself >>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>> >>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind >>>> computation, I conclude that: >>>> >>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>>> directly. >>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical >>>> explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. >>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be >>>> redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the >>>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP >>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
