On 24 Feb 2014, at 18:48, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Bruno,
PS: I have no idea what you are asking in the following question. If
you make it clear I'll try to respond....
"You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time
and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of
that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective
time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively
relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp")."
Yes, explain how my p-time is stuck on the 24 Feb 2014 :)
More seriously I guess you agree that p-time cannot be the subjective
timing, all right? If my brain is slowed down, "synchronically" (as it
is is possible with comp), things would be like accelerating around
me, from my 1p-view, and my subjective time-scale will be felt
different (eyes open), and similar (eyes close).
Bruno
Edgar
On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,
I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some
consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to
distinguish it from my computational reality.
But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term.
Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer
or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any
mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a
physical implementation of a computation.
You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and
1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that
artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time
scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively
relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
Bruno
:-)
Edgar
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,
Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
Computational Theory of Mind.
Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I
agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly
and natural, when I suspect that is neither.
Craig
Edgar
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe
the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which
computations are encountered.
My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is
counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I
propose that
1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
and
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-
acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be
pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of
how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated
from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that
an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a
hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data?
How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the
machine?
Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism
behind computation, I conclude that:
4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical
theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical
inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii
fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro
level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro
level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid,
and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the
fallacy directly.
8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-
theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters
is the sole axiom.
9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science
can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to
reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-
subordinate.
10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation,
rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds
from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an
impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.
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