On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:03:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > This might be a more concise way of making my argument: > > It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the > method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are > encountered. > > My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as > experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted > must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that > > 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and > 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic > re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. > 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be > pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. > > My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how > numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the > whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual > machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, > but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself > from data which is not relevant to the machine? > > Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind > computation, I conclude that: > > > Your questions above are answered in computer science. >
What makes the answers applicable beyond computer science? > I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the notion of > UD, and still ask how "numbers can encounter something". > > Then a notion like "encounter" seems to assume many vague things. But > then you say it is just sense. > What does 'encounter' assume? > > > I don't see a theory. > We have to go beyond theory to see sense, just as we have to wake up to some degree to know that we were dreaming. > > > > > 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory > of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. > 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry > to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. > > > ? > Arithmetic does not examine its own origin, it assumes them from the start. > > > > 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, > as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental > phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena > which is overlooked entirely within CTM. > 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and > should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy > directly. > 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical > explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. > > > You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special terms. > If I am suggesting a solution that has not existed before, what term could I use to refer to it that is not 'special'? > > I will believe that you have a theory, when what you predict is invariant > for the terming used. > Not sure what you mean. > > > > 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be > redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the > foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. > > > We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense, > We don't need to grasp sense, we are sense, our lives are sensed. Numbers are not easily grasp, and the vast majority of people alive today and in human history have been almost mathematically illiterate. > and humans are known to fight on this since day one. > You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you going > to just talk with yourself. > That would seem to contradict the universality of mechanism. How is a machine talking to itself different from agreeing to talk about the same things with others? It seems like an argument for conformity for the sake of conformity. Others can find ways to agree with me too, you know...unless I am a machine that is made specially different. > > > > 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather > than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a > perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, > theoretical platform of sense. > > > That is quite imprecise. > It's too compressed as a sentence, I agree. All I'm trying to say is that machines can tell the truth about some aspects of subjectivity and other parts of the cosmos also, but not because they have any subjective experience. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
