On 09 Mar 2014, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming?

I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each "branching" only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience?

Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism.

At each "branching" only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.

But you have to explain this anyway;

Why? Not at all.




except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality.

This is entirely explained by the self-duplication (with comp, in arithmetic), or with self-superposition (with Everett-QM).





Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero).

That explains nothing without the MWI, or without self-duplication. Decoherence explains just why it is hard to get the interference effects with macro-bodies, as they get entangled quickly with the environment. decoherence might explain also the importance of the position observable, in the story of our brain. But the explanation of indeterminacy, within a deterministic frame is provided by the SWE, or by arithmetic (assuming comp).



Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, "QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect?"

Hmm... Only, as Omnes explained in once of this book, by accepting to be irrational on this.




My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions,

Which QM?
Copenhagen QM works very well, but does not make sense (to be short).
Everett-QM works as well, makes sense, but uses computationalism, which forces us to derive the SWE 1p plural appearance from pure arithmetic. But that is nice, as it suggests where the wave comes from.





but "comp" as a new speculative theory


It is the oldest theory of humanity, I would say. And I think that it is less speculative than the alternate theory, which either use sacred text (a non sequitur in science), or a speculation that Church thesis might be false, etc.





kind of gets a free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we not experience superpositions? Why isn't there a superposition of the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp.

??????

What would that mean? Comp explains, completely, why the M-guy feels to be only in M, and why the W-guy feels to be only in W, despite being in both city, from a external point of view.






How can consciousness be instantiated by physical processes?

Comp explains this by self-reference and its intensional nuance.



Most people on this list just assume it can't and dismiss the very idea as mere physicalism.

Not at all. Consciousness needs in all case a physical body, to manifest itself relatively to other universal machine. If not we would get only the dreams, and no sharable interference.




But they don't ask how can consciousness be instantiated by infinite threads of computation - that's mysterious and consciousness is mysterious, so it's OK.

Comp is not a solution per se. Comp makes just possible to translate the problem into an explanation of where the physical laws come from, in a constructive way, so that we can test comp.





If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking.

But you know that is not what is done. QM predicts probability distributions that are confirmed to many decimal places.

Which QM?



QFT predicts some measured values to 11 decimal places.

Only Everett-QM does that. QFT makes no sense with the collapse.



And you rely on QM to explain the world in in you theory of comp.

That's not true. I rely to QM to estimate if comp is correct.




Your approach is to explain QM and then let QM do the rest of the work - which is fine.

That's more correct.



But my point is that QM can still do the work even if it's a probabilistic theory.

It remains a probabilistic theory with Everett and, with comp, it is even more probabilistic.

But we search a theory compatible with consciouness, not eliminating the subject, etc.

The goal is not to have a working theory, even if it has to work in principle. The goal is to solve the mind-bpody problem, or just to formulate it precisely in the frame of a precise hypothesis which has a long tradition.



So unless comp can make some better predictions than comp it's just an interpretation


It is not. Comp is precise statement about your possibility of surviving some 3p self-transformation. It is either true or false. We can study the consequence in the case it would be true.

The consequences are not "interpretation". They are facts which up to now are confirmed by QM (and QM logic or weirdness can be said to be explained by comp, up to now), but which might very well be refuted in some future.




and it's trading off a distaste for randomness (a very restricted and well defined randomness) for a love of everythingism.


"everything" is a consequence of comp. That is why I came to this list. And the "everything" of comp, although big compared to the observable physical universe, is a very tiny part of arithmetic (the sigma_1 part of arithmetic). Everyone believe in it (and use in math, physics, and engineering), except a tiny finite number of ultrafinitist philosopher.




Which is why I hope comp can predict something about consciousness; where it may offer something beyond just interpretation.

That does not, in general, make sense, because consciousness is 1p, and not sharable, although we can imagine some protocol making partial sense of this, like predicting a new qualia or something.

The point is more that comp predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to be more refutable than this. Just compare the theorems of Z1* and the quantum tautologies, or any bet we are doing about the physical laws. Wait perhaps to understand why Z1*, and what is Z1*, and its relation with the UDA.

I just show the incompatibility between Digital Mechanism and Materialism. And I show it constructively by explaining that computationalism can explain the appearance of some "matter", that we can compare with empirical matter.

Bruno


Brent



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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