On 10 Mar 2014, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom
Could you elaborate?
Imagine you "embed yourself" in a virtual environment "hereby". We
might easily fake a reality obeying different laws, yet the "first
person probabilities" we stay in those "fake" physical universe, is
inheritated by their emulation in our "normal" neighborhoods,
"hereby". We can experience fiction, and indeed we do that all the
time.
In that virtuality reality you can decide to compare its logic of
observability, if you find one, and the universal machine "physics",
as defined in step seven in UDA, and by []p & <>t in AUDA (mainly,
with p sigma_1, it determine the modal logic Z1*).
Now, in a very superficial cartoon-like reality, you might obviously
single out the trick, and not been deluded, a bit like in a lucid dream.
But in our physical reality?
Imagine that Z1* and the "physical reality differ". What can we
conclude?
Well we might conclude either that [comp + Theaetetus] is refuted, or
that we belong in a "fake" simulation done at a the "authentic" Z1*
arithmetical level, perhaps by our "descendants". If that is the
(arithmetical) case we might access to state when we remember having
decided to live an ancestor life, or something of that kind.
Descartes understood that if mechanism is true, we might be failed by
daemons, and that is why he want to assume that God is good, and
protects us from the "liar" daemons. But the arithmetical reality is a
terrible gallery of illusions, and Z1* describes what follows from
below our substitution level, but as I said, we cannot "know" it, we
can only trust, or not trust, a "doctor" and probable universal
neighbors.
With comp, a red pill can lead to other red pills, like a sequence of
false awakenings.
Bruno
David
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