On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been
refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science
in his own term, paradoxically).ime
Bruno - how do you mean this?
In the paradoxical way, as showing that popper has a point, but that
it should not be taken too much seriously. "0+x = x" is hardly
refutable, yet a *very interesting and fundamental* "scientific" idea.
You have consistently defined science in popper terms?
It is mine, or Socrates one. Popper insists rightly on this, but you
can see this as common sense. This has not prevented Popper to take
some physicalism for granted, though, and Popper is far from being
the most Popperian scientist. But then I have rarely seen a
philosopher following his own philosophy.
OK, this time I'm going to go and find you untold quotes of you
referring to popper, in your papers, in your talks and so on.
Saying you accept popper. I'd do the computer is consciousness thing
at the same time.
?
I accept Popper for a sufficient criterion of "being reasonably
scientific", but I find it part of science and 3p discourses, and
first person plural one, since Socrates. It is just nice that Popper
insists on that criterion.
You've defined theory in conjectural terms.
Theory, or just belief. the theory that you have parents is a
theory. You need to assume it without proof. the same for the
existence of sun and moon.
You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance
- of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with
dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said
you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in
reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something
is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of
this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism.
If something is testable, it is science. But if something is not
testable, it is not necessarily bad science.
well you have the same views as popper on anything philosophy of
science I've seen.
Nice! But I am not that sure.
He wrote a curious book in philosophy of mind, with Eccles. That was a
sort of attempt to rescued dualism in a non mechanist theory. Poorly
convincing, but rather honest and naive (so I appreciate, even if I am
not convinced).
Then Popper missed badly the Everett QM, (not to mention the comp
arithmetic), and developed his "propensity theory", which in my
opinion, illustrates an incorrect use of the analytical tools, like in
the error of logicism and positivism.
Falsifiability might be more a criterion of interestingness, and an
help for clarity, in place the falsifiability is out the possible
practice (like with String Theory according to some, (but not with
comp)).
so it's the same cloak whatever :O)
?
I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that
has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a
problem, and reduce one problem into another.
You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to
the UDA, or to AUDA?
I just try sincerely to understand your point.
You've acknowledged popperianism as the best explanation in various
ways, in various contexts, in various places.
Just an interesting and important feature of science, but not as a
definitive criterion. I don't think this exist.
Most of my lines of argument that you typically return a blank on
involve a criticism of assumptions you are building in, that assume
popper as true?
Partially true. I can use it when I talk to Popperian, but I am not
that much Popperian.
I don't remember you acknowledging a single point as even
understood. I don't remember you changing a major inbuilt assumption
of popper, some of which I've pointed at agaain and again, some of
which you were explicitly putting at the centre of a theory. You
didn't complain at the popper linkage....on the contrary the
indicate fun has been you acknowledged and applied popper faithfully
and regarded doing so as a virtue.
OK.
Now you say you regard popper as refuted.
Only if you take him literally, which I do not. I just do science,
not philosophy of science.
Did I just refute popper in your view?
Why? No. I don't see it. John Case did it, at least in theory:
,
Case was philosophy standard....mine is science standard. Would you
mind actually reading it please..it's only a few lines in the middle?
?
Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science
standard.
Could you give me which few lines in the middle?
You lost me completely.
Sorry,
Bruno
CASE J. & NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979, Refinements of inductive inference
by Popperian
machines. Tech. Rep., Dept. of Computer Science, State Univ. of New-
York, Buffalo.
You might find help in studying also:
CASE J. & SMITH C., 1983, Comparison of Identification Criteria for
Machine Inductive
Inference. In Theoretical Computer Science 25,.pp 193-220.
I don't think that's only a refutation of popper. Nor is it the only
refutation of popper. I think - or I theorized as part of the effort
- that I would seek to provide something that'd be my best shot at
something that you would get. For being also, something that you'd
pretty immediately see was true in lots of ways that directly
connected to things your reasoning, or the standard reasoning
behind, also say to be true.
A reasoning cannot be true, only valid. propositions, like axioms
and theorems can be said to be true, or false. usually we cannot
know that for sure, but we can believe them, and they can be true.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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