On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at >>> all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? >>> >>> >>> *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? >>> * >>> >>> If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, >>> >>> True; but I don't assume that. >>> >>> >>> Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - >>> which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell >>> us what you *are* assuming? >>> >>> >>> I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume >>> something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then >>> suppose that at each "branching" only one instance of you continues. >>> Doesn't that accord with all experience? >>> >>> >>> Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest >>> theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or >>> computationalism. >>> >>> At each "branching" only one instance of you continue, you say, but >>> that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits >>> experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the >>> micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even >>> bigger to computationalism. >>> >>> >>> But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed >>> into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in >>> decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very >>> small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at >>> the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, "QM is a probabilistic theory, >>> so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect?" >>> >>> My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a >>> mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but "comp" as a new >>> speculative theory kind of gets a free ride >>> >>> >>> hear hear. And MWI. >>> >>> >>> Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp, >>> especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. >>> Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not >>> play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse. >>> >>> Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take >>> granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of "absence of >>> magic". Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. >>> >>> Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and >>> *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. >>> >>> Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to >>> believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... >>> nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of "knowledge" is >>> inaccurate (S4)). >>> Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already >>> refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. >>> >>> UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it >>> seems to predict an inflation of "self-superposition" in infinitely many >>> histories. >>> >>> This fails, because >>> 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no >>> sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. >>> 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure >>> on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we >>> have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. >>> >>> Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> I don't look at it like that. There's a lot we see things differently >> about. For example in our discussions about comp, you've persistently >> interpreted what I have said solely in terms of your own theory. Which is >> understandable because your view is that science, in context of one person >> relating a theory to another person, seeking take-up, operates by that >> other person accepting the terms of that theory as the starting point, as >> standard. >> >> The reason you probably think that is because your starting points enjoy >> a consensus in the field you work in, and among those proximate to you. >> Like most others here on this list. >> >> But that isn't the true starting point for the scientist, but instead a >> special case of the starting point defined by whatever the shared position >> is at the outset. The true starting point is to look at the field, or its >> components, at a high level and assess first whether the construction of >> the starting position of the theory, is properly supported in hard science. >> Or is it pregnant with unhandled, unsupported assumptions. >> >> It's not necessary to learn that much up front, if it is possible to >> simply ask what the assumptions are in simple terms, and whether and what >> extent they are supported. This, is not actually about the assumptions >> themselves, but the methodological approaches to their assembly. It's >> acceptable in science to have unsupported assumptions, but the way this is >> managed is by compensating for the knowledge gap, methodologically by >> hardening that end up. So to balance. >> >> That's the way it has always been done, in the threads of science that >> went on to be most influential and transformative. The Popperian view is >> not all wrong, but it has a blind spot for this sort of translation between >> hard knowledge and methodology. For example, a central claim - of Popper or >> the Deutsch led neo-Popperian view, is that everything starts with an >> explicit, well detailed explanation. >> >> This is what you ask for above. A competing explanation. The Popper view >> has to require this, because it's only with a non-vague, explicit set of >> claims, that the Popper conception of criticism can fire into action. >> Whether it takes place internally in our minds, or as a collaboration. And >> of course the Popper explanation of objective knowledge is the outcome of >> sequences of conjecture refutation events, that via rational memes acquire >> a version of natural selection which drives evolution of knowledge. >> >> Within this, there's the principle of fallibalism, that objectively true >> statements must be assumed impossible, for the simple reason we don't know >> for sure which parts are objective and which aren't. It's possible to >> stumble on an objectively true statement, but how would we know? It's the >> process of C&R that resolves the matter. And for that we need explicit >> claims about the world that can be criticized. >> >> All which is fine. But implicitly or otherwise, the assumption becomes >> that objectively true statements are impossible to make. >> >> And that isn't true. Popperianism sits at one end of a spectrum of >> possibilities, that is traversable methodologically via exchanges between >> certainty and usefulness. To the Popperian, suggestion of this is >> irrelevant because how can something that isn't useable - like something >> vague - have value. it can't be criticized, so knowledge cannot be evolved. >> >> But in fact, the other end of the spectrum, where objectively true >> statements are possible, can be made useful by methodological translation. >> The starting principle is that we can make an objectively true statement >> just so long as we *deliberately* make sure it contains no useful >> information, in and of itself. We make this worthwhile by translating all >> the same principles to their equivalent form at that end of the spectrum. >> >> For example, instead of overt content-rich claims, we now have >> constraints. A vague, objectively true but useless, statement......paired >> to another vague, objectively true but useless statement, may in some cases >> have implications when taken together. That don't tell us anything about >> the world in terms of its properties. But do constrain the possible range >> of properties that can be true. >> >> I'm talking about the tautology. The truism. The trivially true. I'm >> talking about what is historically, overwhelming, the starting point >> of what goes on to be successful science. Or one part of the successful >> formula. >> >> It's a part Popperianism excludes from itself. The reality of this - just >> the fact it is incontrovertibly true as a historical fact - leads to worse >> implications for Popperianism. For their response would be "so what, there >> is no static Popperian view, but only the conjectural. Criticism >> will sort it out". >> >> But the question of whether there has been criticism of this shortcoming >> is not philosophical, but historical. It never happened. Despite the fact >> Science - its actual history which we can look at retrospectively in terms >> of what work came to define the scientific view and knowledge it contained >> - is unequivocal the starting points were always the way I mention. Despite >> that, the criticism and correction never arrived. Why? I think its because >> they lost the conceptual distinctions that would be necessary upfront to >> think coherently about the issue. >> >> Done right, objective statements can be made, or maximized in their >> objectivity, by ensuring by design, no useful information can be taken away >> from them. Two of them together, properly paired (i.e. not just any two) >> can have useful information when considered together, and that useful >> information will inherit the quantity of being maximally objectively true. >> >> That's the construction of, say, Darwin's natural selection. Individually >> useless, but objectively maximal statements are made, and properly paired >> up. Taken together they have implications, that lead on to an insight of >> natural selection. Such insights have a special property that we >> intuitively recognize. The property is that they seem to prove >> themselves by their very definition. >> >> In fact the natural selection example, piles on further problems for >> Popper, because seen this way, poppers own interpretation of natural >> selection - that is fundamental to his whole theory, is drawn into >> question. Very serious questions. But that's another story and I already >> digress too far. >> >> So back to the matter of comp, now in terms of the importance of method, >> method now hopefully tentatively established as a powerfully important >> component, that goes way beyond the boilerplate formulas for what is >> 'science' currently in play. >> >> I've asked questions about method. You have not answered them. You say >> you have been trying to understand me. I believe you have been trying. But >> what you haven't been doing, is trying to understand me at all. Evidence? >> Well, is there a single instance in all our discussion where you say "ok, >> so is this what you mean? I can see what you are thinking. OK, I don't >> agree, but let's work this through on your terms, and I believe we can do >> that , because I believe the science is robust. Let's do that, and through >> doing that, let us take that slightly scenic view together, off the beaten >> track; walk with me and I'll escort you back to where I am already. Because >> there are many paths, but only one landscape." >> >> Or words to that effect. >> > > And I get it, that you don't understand what I am thinking, and there's > likely a consensus around that too, that I'm not being coherent. > > > Well, thanks for answering for me. I might indeed have some difficulty > seeing your point here. Usually I prefer to separate philosophical analysis > from the technical points. That is why I separate also completely the > question of the truth of comp and its consequences from the question as to > know if comp does lead to such consequences. > > > > > And I'm accommodating that and answering that, above. How could you get > what I'm asking while cloaked in the Popperian view as true. > > > I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been > refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science in his > own term, paradoxically).ime > Bruno - how do you mean this? You have consistently defined science in popper terms? You've defined theory in conjectural terms. You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance - of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism. You've acknowledged popperianism as the best explanation in various ways, in various contexts, in various places. Most of my lines of argument that you typically return a blank on involve a criticism of assumptions you are building in, that assume popper as true? I don't remember you acknowledging a single point as even understood. I don't remember you changing a major inbuilt assumption of popper, some of which I've pointed at agaain and again, some of which you were explicitly putting at the centre of a theory. You didn't complain at the popper linkage....on the contrary the indicate fun has been you acknowledged and applied popper faithfully and regarded doing so as a virtue. Now you say you regard popper as refuted. Did I just refute popper in your view? I don't think that's only a refutation of popper. Nor is it the only refutation of popper. I think - or I theorized as part of the effort - that I would seek to provide something that'd be my best shot at something that you would get. For being also, something that you'd pretty immediately see was true in lots of ways that directly connected to things your reasoning, or the standard reasoning behind, also say to be true. I thought I was giving something there that can sit beneath things, at least potentially. Beneath logic. Arithmetic. Something also that can reinforce, and prove things, and generate empirical predictions from things, not previously possible so directly to do. Very ambitious hopefulness. I know. I have to be willing to look a fool, for being wrong. Or even made a fool for being right. But in a way it is predictive. Contingent on you....being in the role of objective reality. What you say is true will be true. To the extent I'm right that's going to be a reversal moment for you, a healing moment....I hope. Apologies if I just lost you Bruno
> I certainly don't believe anything in the sense of believing it true. I > prefer to just make clear the assumptions, and reason from there, until I > found a contradiction.e > You know the popperian criteria of what is true, accommodates this fully. > > One of the thing I want to illustrate is that we can tackle > "philosophical" or "theological" questions with the same rigor than in math > or physics, once we choose the hypothesis making that possible. > Computationalism is such an hypothesis. It is a lamp and I search the key > under that lamps, because it is too much dark elsewhere. > There are implications of meaning that in a certain range of ways....that would have translated to implications for the popperian view that is evident throughout. At least to appreciate a direct argument based around an assumption being unsafe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
