On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as
true randomness at all? Or
is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true
randomness?
If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.
Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context
- which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you
could tell us what you are assuming?
I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could
assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start
with MWI but then suppose that at each "branching" only one instance
of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience?
Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest
theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or
computationalism.
At each "branching" only one instance of you continue, you say, but
that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two
slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions
act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM
(= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.
But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is
transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably
the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the
density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you
have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes
does, and say, "QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts
probabilities. What did you expect?"
My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is
a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but "comp"
as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride
hear hear. And MWI.
Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp,
especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter.
Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not
play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse.
Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take
granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of
"absence of magic". Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke
actual infinities.
Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and +
and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday.
Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin
to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation
move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of
"knowledge" is inaccurate (S4)).
Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already
refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence.
UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as
it seems to predict an inflation of "self-superposition" in infinitely
many histories.
This fails, because
1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no
sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition.
2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like
structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the
picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic
inflates too much.
Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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