On 27 Apr 2014, at 19:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/27/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think the same. That's close to Platonism. There is more than
what we see, measure, etc.
Then we can theorize, which means making assumptions (like "the
moon exist"), and experimentation, like "going on the moon". This
will not prove that the moon exists in any real or fundamental way,
LOL. I think you've been a logician to long. :-)
Just being a rationalist, and interested in things going beyond the
usual FAPP (For All Practical Purposes).
To go to the moon, we need some "existence" of the moon, not
necessarily an ontological existence.
To solve the mind-body problem, or to put light on the nature of
matter and consciousness (and their relations) it is important to
understand that seeing, experiencing, ... don't prove (in the informal
logician or mathematician sense indeed) anything about 'reality'.
I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still
exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case,
definitely not exist".
Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon
doesn't exist even when we look at it.
Only the relative relations between my computational states and
infinitely many computations exists.
If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then
it survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the
moon has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity
of computations in arithmetic, and cannot be related from anything
else. The math confirmed that this makes sense, as the logic of
'certainty" ([]p & <>t) gives a quantum logic on the arithmetical
sigma_1 (computational) proposition p.
Bruno
Brent
He's like a philosopher who says, "I know it's possible in
practice. Now I'd like to know whether it's possible in
principle."
--- Daniel Dennett, on Michael Behe
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