It is not possible to define the concept of existence without resorting in some kind of belief. That is why talking seriously about existence is carefully avoided.
2014-04-29 10:18 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 27 Apr 2014, at 19:38, meekerdb wrote: > > On 4/27/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I think the same. That's close to Platonism. There is more than what we > see, measure, etc. > Then we can theorize, which means making assumptions (like "the moon > exist"), and experimentation, like "going on the moon". This will not prove > that the moon exists in any real or fundamental way, > > > LOL. I think you've been a logician to long. :-) > > > Just being a rationalist, and interested in things going beyond the usual > FAPP (For All Practical Purposes). > > To go to the moon, we need some "existence" of the moon, not necessarily > an ontological existence. > To solve the mind-body problem, or to put light on the nature of matter > and consciousness (and their relations) it is important to understand that > seeing, experiencing, ... don't prove (in the informal logician or > mathematician sense indeed) anything about 'reality'. > > I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still > exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case, > definitely not exist". > > Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon > doesn't exist even when we look at it. > Only the relative relations between my computational states and infinitely > many computations exists. > > If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then it > survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon > has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of > computations in arithmetic, and cannot be related from anything else. The > math confirmed that this makes sense, as the logic of 'certainty" ([]p & > <>t) gives a quantum logic on the arithmetical sigma_1 (computational) > proposition p. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > He's like a philosopher who says, "I know it's possible in > practice. Now I'd like to know whether it's possible in > principle." > --- Daniel Dennett, on Michael Behe > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
