I've been following the "Is consciousness computable?" thread and it occurs to me that there may be a contradiction in the UDA. Step 6 introduces the idea that we can teleport a "brain" (i.e. digitally instantiate a set of memories, predispositions etc) into a computed virtual environment. Yet according to the final conclusion of the UDA, physics is necessarily non-computable, because it arises from an infinity of computations. If step 6 is to work, ISTM that physics *has* to be computable. It will not be enough that we *approximate* physics computationally, because we can always imagine teleporting the brain from and into a physics lab where advanced particle experiments are being carried out. We can imagine here an arbitrarily advanced physics lab of the future capable of carrying out the most advanced experiments that are theoretically possible. The simulated lab must reproduce the exact same results as the actual lab or the teleportation fails - the "brain" can tell there's been a switch. If the conclusion of UDA is non-computable physics, but the reasoning to reach that conclusion depends on it, then clearly the argument is faulty. This might even constitute a real argument for primitive matter (not that I'm a fan of it), since primitive matter stops us proceeding at step 7, thus saving us from the contradiction.
Bruno, how are you getting out of this one? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
