On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 3:39:21 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 May 2014, at 03:01, Pierz wrote: > > I've been following the "Is consciousness computable?" thread and it > occurs to me that there may be a contradiction in the UDA. Step 6 > introduces the idea that we can teleport a "brain" (i.e. digitally > instantiate a set of memories, predispositions etc) into a computed virtual > environment. > > > OK. Precisely we bet that there is a description level of the brain which > will preserve its functioning, and manifest the person consciousness with > intact memories, etc. > > > > Yet according to the final conclusion of the UDA, physics is necessarily > non-computable, because it arises from an infinity of computations. If step > 6 is to work, ISTM that physics *has* to be computable. > > > That does not follow. > The virtual environment simulating Moscow and Washington can even be very > crude, so that you know in advance that you will be aware of being in a > video game. But once you bet on a description level, you can bet you will > survive in such environment, and discover that they are fake, indeed, if > you have enough time, and fair ways to explore the environment. Step six is > only about the invariance of the (local) probability calculus for the real, > and locally virtual change, *for a second*. > > > > > It will not be enough that we *approximate* physics computationally, > because we can always imagine teleporting the brain from and into a physics > lab where advanced particle experiments are being carried out. We can > imagine here an arbitrarily advanced physics lab of the future capable of > carrying out the most advanced experiments that are theoretically possible. > The simulated lab must reproduce the exact same results as the actual lab > or the teleportation fails - the "brain" can tell there's been a switch. If > the conclusion of UDA is non-computable physics, but the reasoning to reach > that conclusion depends on it, then clearly the argument is faulty. This > might even constitute a real argument for primitive matter (not that I'm a > fan of it), since primitive matter stops us proceeding at step 7, thus > saving us from the contradiction. > > Bruno, how are you getting out of this one? > > > Well tried :) >
It was a good try, huh! But yeah, I get it. The point is really that it is per se possible for one's environment to be virtual rather than physical. Damn! Another lance broken jousting your windmill... :) > > But good point, UDA benefits of two readings. In the second reading you > can keep in mind that we reason assuming those normal histories, in which > the duplication experiments, and experiences, are done. > This does not solve the rabbit problem, but then that's why I interview > the machine on it. > The rabbit problem? Calicivirus is quite effective I believe. :) You're referring to the measure problem? How does the machine interview help? > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
