On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 06:01:39PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
> I've been following the "Is consciousness computable?" thread and it occurs 
> to me that there may be a contradiction in the UDA. Step 6 introduces the 
> idea that we can teleport a "brain" (i.e. digitally instantiate a set of 
> memories, predispositions etc) into a computed virtual environment. Yet 
> according to the final conclusion of the UDA, physics is necessarily 
> non-computable, because it arises from an infinity of computations. If step 
> 6 is to work, ISTM that physics *has* to be computable. It will not be 
> enough that we *approximate* physics computationally, because we can always 
> imagine teleporting the brain from and into a physics lab where advanced 
> particle experiments are being carried out. We can imagine here an 
> arbitrarily advanced physics lab of the future capable of carrying out the 
> most advanced experiments that are theoretically possible. The simulated 
> lab must reproduce the exact same results as the actual lab or the 
> teleportation fails - the "brain" can tell there's been a switch. 

Why does it need to produce the exact same results? All it needs to be
is good enough for the brain to be unable to tell there has been a
switch.

For example:

The results here from the lab might be the generation of an
uncomputable random sequence - say in the fluctuations of a laser
beam.

But the computer simulation could replace this with the results of a
cryptographically strong pseudo random generator, and the brain would not
have a clue.


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