On 12 May 2014, at 03:01, Pierz wrote:
I've been following the "Is consciousness computable?" thread and it
occurs to me that there may be a contradiction in the UDA. Step 6
introduces the idea that we can teleport a "brain" (i.e. digitally
instantiate a set of memories, predispositions etc) into a computed
virtual environment.
OK. Precisely we bet that there is a description level of the brain
which will preserve its functioning, and manifest the person
consciousness with intact memories, etc.
Yet according to the final conclusion of the UDA, physics is
necessarily non-computable, because it arises from an infinity of
computations. If step 6 is to work, ISTM that physics has to be
computable.
That does not follow.
The virtual environment simulating Moscow and Washington can even be
very crude, so that you know in advance that you will be aware of
being in a video game. But once you bet on a description level, you
can bet you will survive in such environment, and discover that they
are fake, indeed, if you have enough time, and fair ways to explore
the environment. Step six is only about the invariance of the (local)
probability calculus for the real, and locally virtual change, *for a
second*.
It will not be enough that we approximate physics computationally,
because we can always imagine teleporting the brain from and into a
physics lab where advanced particle experiments are being carried
out. We can imagine here an arbitrarily advanced physics lab of the
future capable of carrying out the most advanced experiments that
are theoretically possible. The simulated lab must reproduce the
exact same results as the actual lab or the teleportation fails -
the "brain" can tell there's been a switch. If the conclusion of UDA
is non-computable physics, but the reasoning to reach that
conclusion depends on it, then clearly the argument is faulty. This
might even constitute a real argument for primitive matter (not that
I'm a fan of it), since primitive matter stops us proceeding at step
7, thus saving us from the contradiction.
Bruno, how are you getting out of this one?
Well tried :)
But good point, UDA benefits of two readings. In the second reading
you can keep in mind that we reason assuming those normal histories,
in which the duplication experiments, and experiences, are done.
This does not solve the rabbit problem, but then that's why I
interview the machine on it.
Bruno
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