I thought of that - a kind of quantum Truman Show in which the computer fakes QM effects with a pseudo-random number generator, or even some other quantum source (like the laser?). However mere random sequences will not fool a sophisticated enough lab experiment. Otherwise we'd never have got MWI as a theory, we'd just have a science of disconnected randomness. In fact what we have is entangled randomness, which requires far greater computational sophistication on the part of the simulator. In fact a quantum computer is definitely required - convincing fakes aren't good enough. Given that a QC is possible, we can imagine our hero performing a quantum calculation on it and then allowing the teleportation to the simulated lab, where he carries out the same experiment. OK, so we can allow the computer he is in to perform all kinds of tricks, like copying the previous results etc, but then we're really in a murky situation, because we've presumed that the computer *can't* simulate the actual experiment but has to pull these dirty tricks, and I think that's illegitimate. We can't make special cases for the computer, allowing it to, say, alter the protagonist's memory, or create the qualia of "Oh I got the same result!" even though the result was actually different. The simulated physics has to match the real physics in an arbitrarily sophisticated test. Otherwise we have one of those inexplicable situations that Deutsch talks about, that make a mockery of explanation itself. The notion of a simulated Helsinki etc is meretriciously appealing. But we need to consider all possible simulation scenarios, and that includes the most advanced and far-reaching physical continuity tests possible.
On Monday, May 12, 2014 11:26:51 AM UTC+10, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 06:01:39PM -0700, Pierz wrote: > > I've been following the "Is consciousness computable?" thread and it > occurs > > to me that there may be a contradiction in the UDA. Step 6 introduces > the > > idea that we can teleport a "brain" (i.e. digitally instantiate a set of > > memories, predispositions etc) into a computed virtual environment. Yet > > according to the final conclusion of the UDA, physics is necessarily > > non-computable, because it arises from an infinity of computations. If > step > > 6 is to work, ISTM that physics *has* to be computable. It will not be > > enough that we *approximate* physics computationally, because we can > always > > imagine teleporting the brain from and into a physics lab where advanced > > particle experiments are being carried out. We can imagine here an > > arbitrarily advanced physics lab of the future capable of carrying out > the > > most advanced experiments that are theoretically possible. The simulated > > lab must reproduce the exact same results as the actual lab or the > > teleportation fails - the "brain" can tell there's been a switch. > > Why does it need to produce the exact same results? All it needs to be > is good enough for the brain to be unable to tell there has been a > switch. > > For example: > > The results here from the lab might be the generation of an > uncomputable random sequence - say in the fluctuations of a laser > beam. > > But the computer simulation could replace this with the results of a > cryptographically strong pseudo random generator, and the brain would not > have a clue. > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]<javascript:> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret > (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
