split brain is possible and has been done, ship of theseus already happens at the physical and psychological level all the time. I dont think physical continuity should matter. If someone deconstructed and reconstructed me nothing is lost.
On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/15/2014 9:13 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote: > > Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain > thought experiment or ship of theseus. > > > But you don't know that those are possible. > > Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person. > > > It's just a semantic choice. > > There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are > indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done > semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the > particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you > are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. > It isnt physically meaningful. > > > Suppose someone made a duplicate of you. The duplicate claims to own your > house, and goes to court for possession. Do you think the court should not > consider it meaningful that one of you has physical continuity and the > doesn't? How do you decide what's "meaningful" and what isn't? > > Brent > > > So the illusion is persistent, but i can see the seams. > > On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> > wrote: > >> On 5/14/2014 11:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: >> >> I'm deeply conflicted. On one had I want the illusion but i also want to >> act in accordance with the truth. >> >> >> Ah, there's your problem. "The truth" is likely unknowable. "The >> illusion" is what's knowable - so why denigrate it? >> >> Brent >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%[email protected]');> > . > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
