On 5/15/2014 11:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 08:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
    But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

    Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for 
robbing an
    orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and 
to
    have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be 
admitted to
    be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having 
been
    flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his 
taking the
    standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.
        These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE'S doctrine, that 
he who
    was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he 
who
    took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it 
follows, if
    there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him 
who was
    flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so far 
back as
    his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE'S doctrine, he is not the 
person
    who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not 
the same
    person with him who was flogged at a school.

    Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily 
continuity.


It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on.

What we do since we are amoebas. And before.

Amoebas divide - which is not the same as duplicate in the sense of the 
Helsinki man.

Brent

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