On 19 May 2014 15:11, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/18/2014 6:26 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >>> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the >>> scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but then >>> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other >>> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and >>> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add >>> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your friends >>> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. >>> >> > I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He > claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by most > scientists who believe in primary materialism - that consciousness is > computable. Given this assumption and a couple of others, he argues to a > certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism fails. > > > Not that it fails, but that it's dispensable; that matter may be necessary > for our existence (when I've argued for that point I think he has agreed) > but if so it is derivable from the computations of the UD, so it's not > primary. >
If matter isn't primary, "primary materialism" fails! (Or something. Maybe "fails" is the wrong word :-) > I'm not sure he's wrong, but I'm not convinced by his MGA or Maudlin's > Olympia argument. I think that for them to go through, to show that > consciousness can be instantiated with no physical action, depends on > anticipating all possible counterfactuals, i.e. simulating a "world" which > the consciousness is relative to. I think that to simulate consciousness > within a simulated world removes the distinction of "simulated" and the > argument becomes vacuous. > Yes, I have a similar problem with it. If I understand correctly (now there's a big counterfactual...) the MGA purports to recreate consciousness by effectively replaying a recording of all the material processes that accompanied it the first time around. I find it hard to see how this *wouldn't* recreate the same experiences, assuming that consciousness arises from physical processes, but I also find it rather hard to get my head around the whole idea anyway, so I can't claim to fully grasp it and so far I remain agnostic on any claims made on that basis. > Simulated physics is happening in that simulated world and the simulated > consciousness depends on it. Now if Bruno can predict some new testable > physics from comp, that would be great - but that's a high bar indeed. > Indeed. He does make some claims in that direction but I don't understand enough to comment on those either. > > His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in that > problem is more from an engineering viewpoint. What does it take to make a > conscious machine and what are the advantages or disadvantages of doing > so. Bruno says a machine that can learn and do induction is conscious, > which might be testable - but I think it would fail. I think that might be > necessary for consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must > be intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that it's > intelligent. > > That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary materialism - otherwise a conscious machine, as commonly understood, might have other attributes that can't be deduced from its structure, and hence the engineering approach will fail. (Hence to be fully confident in this approach you should perhaps show what is wrong with Bruno's starting assumptions, or his deductions.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
