Accordingto Deutsch, MWI is falsifiable, with some actions of a quantum 
computer. These would be the heavy hitters of QC, and not the lab toys we have 
today, but we'd potentially have access to electrons in parallel cosmii. 
 


 Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is 
not falsifiable or testable.

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sat, May 17, 2014 11:41 pm
Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?


Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me 
that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI 
itself is not falsifiable or testable.


 And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think 
it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so 
rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world.


However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination.
Richard




On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM,  <[email protected]> wrote:


On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote:



On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:


          
    
On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
    
    
      
        
          
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]>            wrote:
            
              
                
                  
                    
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
                    
                    
                      
                        
                          
On 14 May 2014 06:29,                            meekerdb <[email protected]> 
                           wrote:
                            
                              
                                
                                  
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno                                    Marchal wrote:
                                  
                                
                                
                                  
                                    
Turing *emulation*                                      is only meaningful in 
the context                                      of emulating one part relative 
to                                      another part that is not emulated,      
                                i.e. is "real". 
                                    
                                    If you say so. We can still listen          
                          to the machine, and compare with                      
              nature. 
                                  
                                
                                When we compare with nature we find that        
                        some things exist and some don't.
                              
                            
                          
                          
                        
                        
Like other worlds don't                          exist, or atoms don't exist 
... the question                          about what exists hasn't been 
answered yet. Or                          indeed the question about what it 
means for                          something to exist.
                        
                      
                    
                  
                
                So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts            
    it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere                else?
              
            
          
          
        
        
I find it hard to read that into what I          wrote. (Unless "no matter what 
comp predicts" is a slightly          awkward, but potentially rather funny, 
pun?)
          
        
        
But anyway, no that isn't my view.          Either comp is true or it isn't, 
which is to say, either          consciousness is Turing emulable at some 
level, or it isn't.          And if it is, either there is some flaw in what 
Bruno derives          from that assumption, or there isn't.
        
      
    
    
    But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that    we 
should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is    that this 
requires predictions about what happens here and now,    where some things 
happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that    something happens somewhere in 
the multiverse don't satisfy my idea    of testable.






But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and 
white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the 
simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the 
cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 
proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or 
destructive interference in the observations.


To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum 
theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs 
to if comp is true.


My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, 
that concerns you.


It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in 
arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.


I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional 
tautologies.


Bruno


 
 So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of 
testability. 
 
So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain 
this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? 
 
"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics   
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we   
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but   
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well,   
comp + the classical theory of knowledge)." 
 
How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge" change 
the commitment to falsification? 



Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of 
*studying* the papers.  Note that in some presentation, I take the classical 
theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other presentation, I 
explain and answer your question with some detail, and it is the object of the 
thesis.


More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in focus, not 
the success of my pedagogy on this list.


Bruno


 
I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific standards, 
conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and explanations you lay out in 
your theory, may certainly arrive at various conclusions for the implications 
comp has for the world. And I'm quite sure within that you offer your 
explanation for the falsifiability of comp. 
 
But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you think the 
details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the matter of 
falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is irrelevant...on this 
encapsulating turf. 
 
In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In at least 
one of your papers you offer this...little package of philosophical reasoning, 
which 5 lines and 30 seconds later concludes your work is falsifiable so 
scientific. I mentioned at the time the same argument can be formulated for all 
philosophy...and probably religion and everything else. Then you insisted your 
theory is falsifiable because its fundamental position requires huge 
accomplishments, like deriving physics. 
 
So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by 
definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently 
denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to guide 
you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as it would 
have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you claimed 
computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events too. The reason 
I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any clarification or 
edit as the right version if you say it is. 
 
I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated now Bruno, 
is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability actually is. Your 
angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not getting it'....before 
yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply leaves 'no choice'...and 
it's this property of contraining to block all paths but the one, that delivers 
the scientific standard. 
 
But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason your 
theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, and 
compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of possible 
computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is falsified. 
Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified. 
 
There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other more 
careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the properties 
of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe a sort of, 
process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a falsification as one 
possible outcome. 
 
So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the arguments 
of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not even begun to 
approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of what such a 
resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of multiverses of all 
possible computations? And who or what decides when the infinite set is all 
accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the arguments within your 
theory for that? Could it also be your theory currently has no better insight 
of what it even means than I do...not that can be independently verified or 
tested. 
 
So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the summation of 
infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct formulation of the 
'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your theory will  - oneday - 
perform this calculation.....and so your theory will assess the results....and 
then your theory will announce whether it is falsified or not. 
 
You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know why it's 
like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability within your 
theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process of far-future 
sequenced events. 
 
Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this little 
goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your 
theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and willingness to 
engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My intuition 
with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my time by engaging 
with me about the items important to me.....it's very clear at no time have you 
been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of falsification, and confront 
the very obvious serious questions. 
 
So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one else here in 
this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any claims you make.....and 
largely don't really care that much about the old fashioned falsifiability 
thing......all rather passé in the infinite infinities of infinities of 
everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below the belt...no grievance and so 
on. So anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno, and you fool yourself 
this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns are the norm mate. 
 
I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking about, and 
you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away with it because no 
one holds you to account for things like this. But the lone position from 
me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious scientists I should think, 
is that you don't begin to understand the nature and distinctiveness of 
falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher: 
 
1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us something 
NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above offering some new 
*explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is the fundamental 
substance of testability, and falsifiability. 
 
This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single non-trivial 
prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you predict your 
theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue that if it 
doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It does not add 
any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of far future steps. 
The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's as welcome as the 
next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the whole end to end process 
of testing/observing, is complete outside the theory and the whimsical 
arguments of the theorist. And this separation is fundamental. This is what 
it's all about. 
 
So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific 
sense.  No one calls you on this.....here.....but then again.....let's face it 
no one answered my question either. But other there....all you'll accomplish 
with this hubris is to be ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by 
and large. And...I wanted to add value for you....for my part I would actually 
question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because this is one 
tiny goldfish bowl dude. 

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