PGC, If you have not noticed I rarely post here any more. Richard
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < [email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Hibbs, >> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to >> me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet >> MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. >> >> And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I >> think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string >> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a >> single world. >> >> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare >> combination. >> > > You do? > > Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal > attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there > is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't > red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers > that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to > presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? > > Everybody here should know by now that these "attacks" don't lead anywhere > because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief > at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument > and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time > wasters. PGC > > >> Richard >> >> >> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating >>>>>>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>>>>>> nature. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some >>>>>>> don't. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the >>>>>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the >>>>>> question >>>>>> about what it means for something to exist. >>>>>> >>>>>> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not >>>>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter >>>>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, >>>>> pun?) >>>>> >>>>> But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, >>>>> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or >>>>> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives >>>>> from that assumption, or there isn't. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we >>>>> should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this >>>>> requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things >>>>> happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in >>>>> the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white >>>>> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, >>>>> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing >>>>> of >>>>> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 >>>>> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, >>>>> or destructive interference in the observations. >>>>> >>>>> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the >>>>> quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, >>>>> as it needs to if comp is true. >>>>> >>>>> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano >>>>> Arithmetic, that concerns you. >>>>> >>>>> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in >>>>> arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. >>>>> >>>>> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum >>>>> propositional tautologies. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story >>>> of testability. >>>> >>>> So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, >>>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to >>>> that? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics >>>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will >>>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there >>>> is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the >>>> classical theory of knowledge)." * >>>> >>>> How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of >>>> knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? >>>> >>>> >>>> Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of >>>> *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the >>>> classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other >>>> presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it >>>> is the object of the thesis. >>>> >>>> More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in >>>> focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific standards, >>> conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and explanations you lay out >>> in your theory, may certainly arrive at various conclusions for the >>> implications comp has for the world. And I'm quite sure within that you >>> offer your explanation for the falsifiability of comp. >>> >>> But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you >>> think the details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the >>> matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is >>> irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf. >>> >>> In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In >>> at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of >>> philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds >>> later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the >>> time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably >>> religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable >>> because its fundamental position requires huge accomplishments, like >>> deriving physics. >>> >>> So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by >>> definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently >>> denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to >>> guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as >>> it would have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you >>> claimed computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events too. >>> The reason I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any >>> clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is. >>> >>> I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated now >>> Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability actually >>> is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not getting >>> it'....before yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply leaves >>> 'no choice'...and it's this property of contraining to block all paths but >>> the one, that delivers the scientific standard. >>> >>> But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason >>> your theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, >>> and compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of >>> possible computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is >>> falsified. Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified. >>> >>> There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other >>> more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the >>> properties of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe a >>> sort of, process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a falsification >>> as one possible outcome. >>> >>> So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the >>> arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not >>> even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of >>> what such a resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of >>> multiverses of all possible computations? And who or what decides when the >>> infinite set is all accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the >>> arguments within your theory for that? Could it also be your theory >>> currently has no better insight of what it even means than I do...not that >>> can be independently verified or tested. >>> >>> So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the >>> summation of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct >>> formulation of the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your >>> theory will - oneday - perform this calculation.....and so your theory >>> will assess the results....and then your theory will announce whether it is >>> falsified or not. >>> >>> You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know >>> why it's like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability >>> within your theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process >>> of far-future sequenced events. >>> >>> Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this >>> little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your >>> theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and willingness >>> to engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My >>> intuition with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my >>> time by engaging with me about the items important to me.....it's very >>> clear at no time have you been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of >>> falsification, and confront the very obvious serious questions. >>> >>> So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one else >>> here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any claims you >>> make.....and largely don't really care that much about the old fashioned >>> falsifiability thing......all rather passé in the infinite infinities of >>> infinities of everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below the belt...no >>> grievance and so on. So anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno, >>> and you fool yourself this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns >>> are the norm mate. >>> >>> I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking >>> about, and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away >>> with it because no one holds you to account for things like this. But the >>> lone position from me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious >>> scientists I should think, is that you don't begin to understand the nature >>> and distinctiveness of falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher: >>> >>> 1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us >>> something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above >>> offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is >>> the fundamental substance of testability, and falsifiability. >>> >>> This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single non-trivial >>> prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you predict your >>> theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue that if it >>> doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It does not >>> add any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of far future >>> steps. The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's as >>> welcome as the next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the whole >>> end to end process of testing/observing, is complete outside the theory and >>> the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is >>> fundamental. This is what it's all about. >>> >>> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the >>> scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but then >>> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other >>> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and >>> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add >>> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your friends >>> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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