On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: LizR <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm
Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List <[email protected]
> wrote:
So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in
the scientific sense.
Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is
wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its
logic of the observable) and its actual testing?
No one calls you on this.....here.....but then again.....let's face
it no one answered my question either.
I did.
But other there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be
ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by and large.
And...I wanted to add value for you....for my part I would actually
question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because
this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude.
I do have a theory which is hardly not being falsifiable, as it gives
a non trivial propositional physics, already proved to be non boolean
and close of equal to quantum logic. That is the subject of the whole
work.
I will ask you to read my post and perhaps try to make a specific
remark, please.
Bruno
I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He
claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by
most scientists who believe in primary materialism - that
consciousness is computable. Given this assumption and a couple of
others, he argues to a certain conclusion, which is that primary
materialism fails.
Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific
theory, rather than claiming to have one?
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