On 31 May 2014, at 22:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)
This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove
the
possibility of falsification of COMP.
I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a
much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.
But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).
But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different
sort of
physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?
If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and
the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with
an environment disobeying the physical laws.
Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game,
(second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order
"dream", the one emerging from *all* computations going through your
state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the
virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you
can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream
of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey
physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in
them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical
reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey
S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).
If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
one in Alice in Wonderland!
So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we
are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not
sure makes sense).
But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the
LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or
in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real
theory". So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of
comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related
to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the
universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others.
The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some
information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we
belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.
Bruno
I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being
in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality.
David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is
basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all
possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127
and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not
possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a
CantGoTu environment.
Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual
reality environments have measure one in the space of environments
hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum,
whereas
virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0.
But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the
cardinality of the continuum?
Assuming comp, yes. At least in some sense. We can defend that idea.
But it is hard to say if that is confirmed by the observation of the
physical reality, in the sense that we have not yet marry gravitation
and the quantum, and so have not yet a coherent empiric theory of
space-time.
I think.
Bruno
Brent
But we can never
know that we're in one.
DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one
can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of
chess. This is because the "rules of physics" of such an environment
are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But
provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an
observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether
you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above.
The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that
allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_
to
be geography.
The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the
Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail.
Cheers
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