On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: > > > On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: > >> > >>> On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > >>>> On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non- > >>>>> virtual > >>>>> reality environments have measure one in the space of environments > >>>>> hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, > >>>>> whereas > >>>>> virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. > >>>> > >>>> But aren't "we" as physically instantiated beings, also of the > >>>> cardinality of the continuum? > >>>> > >>> > >>> Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be > >>> countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of > >>> programs. > >>> > >>> With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of "real" environments > >>> experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would > >>> include all the CantGoTu environments. > >>> > >>> We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most > >>> likely > >>> not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite > >>> observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). > >>> > >>> I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - > >>> Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being > >>> logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. > >>> > >>> The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon > >>> that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that > >>> falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can > >>> you > >>> possibly distinguish those two situations? > >> > >> We can't. > >> > >> But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at > >> least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming > >> or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, > >> that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). > >> > >> So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe > >> more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp > >> physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the > >> emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are > >> dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) > >> environment/video-game. > >> > >> By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at > >> the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. > >> > >> Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, > >> but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian > >> consistent deception. > >> > >> Bruno > >> > >> > > > > I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not > > in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between > > the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. > > Hmmm.... I see what you mean, and in "that sense" we are at the base > level. > > yet, we can still belong to an emulation build on the top of that base > level, so that it inherits of the measure on all computations. > > If that was not possible, we would not been able to survive with an > artificial brain. If we can, we can survive with the right relative > measure in virtual environment, like the emulation of Washington and > Moscow in step six. > > But this is also what makes it possible for us to discover that we are > in virtual environment, or that we are dreaming. > > > > > > > > > Therefore if > > we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess > > world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must > > be falsified. > > Not necessarily. I might have given you a pill, and then put you in a > very well done emulation, without you noticing any difference (before > comparing the comp physics and the physics of your environment). > > > > > > > Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that > > we are > > in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in > > doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our > > phenomenological physics. > > > > Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be > > violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a > > dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no > > longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude > > that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a > > statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. >
Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly from these first two? What I'm interested in, is what sort of operations could be applied to the multiple other universes...without doing silly things like just assuming this or that. Just because it's unseeable and large, doesn't mean all we can do is make assumptions. I think. I mean, I think a lot of rubbish. You know this...but you promise you speak to 3 times each year. You kind man. Now give me rights...or I'll have you on discrimination legistlation. I've only got one blood leg, is this the way treat a man with one arm? Oh sorry, lost it again. Off for meds. I am not sure we can make something falsifiable into something non falsifiable by an act of faith, ... except indeed by invoking a dream, or a Daemon, but this is of course is a very weak "refutation". I would say that it is better to bet we are not in a second order dream/ emulation by default. If the comp-QL differ from the empiric-QL, it will be time to hesitate between the truth of comp, or of the the classical theory of knowledge, or if we are in a simulation (that might depends on the way the comp-QL is violated). The fact in dispute with ghibbsa is that I am giving a precise way to test comp (with nuance due to the vague character of "test" applied to "reality") when translated in arithmetic. How to interpret a possible violation by nature, will depend on the phenomenon needed to be discovered for that effect. It is more plausible that the comp logics fails to define a quantum computer in the neighborhood, or that it implies modularity and exclude infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, or that it is inconsistent with the different type factor (von Neuman algebra). What if it fails, but still work with []p & <><>t in place of []p & <>t? I would be astonished if we get directly the right logic of the observable in one of S4Grz1, Z1* or X1*. S4Grz1 has all theorems of B (the modal logic of QL), + the orthomodularity, but seems also very close to S5 (as he has reflexion ([]A ->A, symmetry p -> []<>p, but also transitivity []A -> [][]A). It is not S5 because symmetry is only for the sigma_1 sentences p, not arbitrary formula A. Bruno > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au <javascript:> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret > (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
