On 03 Jun 2014, at 05:14, [email protected] wrote:
On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, [email protected] wrote:
On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote:
On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
wrote:
There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually
pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments.
Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article
was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been
identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno
says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the
machine, and so on and so forth
Nice.
Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like "yeah mother
fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia
thread!"
Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it.
What about the issue itself though?
It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be
the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my
position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp
Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough
you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer
scientist "Jacques Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot
believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-
comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen
as an exceptional view.
Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ
which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right
functions at the right level.
Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like
'comp is can replace < organA >with <majorRevolutioninFieldA> +
<majorRevoltion in field B>....+..+...<major revolution in field N>
One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution
that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense
amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I
experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver?
>
Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together
with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the
existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily
refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with
their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations.>
So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something,
because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they
must think at some point involving god and something else?
This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus
composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of
them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with
that.
Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we
don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that
word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they
think they think in terms of comp at all.
What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their
minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This
is a long way now from they believe in comp.
I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a
donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey
exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the
first person is riding a zebra?
Or do I miss the point?
and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on
comp,
What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention
a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?
Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding
things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me?
What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and
directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people
believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming
things like this:
Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -->
brunos's UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head
follows
-->
MWI follows
-->
Infinite dreams follows
* So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI?
Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did,
actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three
and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1-
views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a
philosopher who judged the thesis not receivable (which means not
even a private defense: they have never heard me, even in private)
from his personal conviction (and later invoke the "free-exam"
principle for that, like if the free-exam is the right for professor
to give bad note to student without questioning them).
If someone has said they accept the UDA you're good to say they
accept it. But it isn't going to be right to say that someone
accepts your theory if they accept comp.
"My" theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en
the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2)
"yes doctor" (and the amount of turing universality in the
neighborhood for giving sense to "artificial brain" and "doctor".
By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the
hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature.
This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with
respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically*
extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as "radical" as
reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his "theory"
was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle
followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist,
like some scholars defends).
So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp
theory (which is arguably a very old idea).
Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even
take offense that we can imagine not following comp.
Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing
you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you
r theory. So you are dominating people.
Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to
show a flaw if you think there is one).
I show comp -> something. Of course, after 1500 years of
Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the
reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive.
Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on
in extre dimensional reality?
First, I don't express myself in that way.
For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning
its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which
think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality.
With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal
machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural
numbers) or has a very large cardinal.
Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary
arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic).
I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter,
and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology.
Do theybelieve in MWI
This is ambiguous.
In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of "super-atheism",
as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or
become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation.
So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory.
What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine
the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They
exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary
arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material.
the infinite multiverse of dreams?
If you agree that the natural numbers obeys to the axioms (with s(x)
intended for the successor of x, that is x+1):
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
Then you get the "multiverse of dreams" by comp.
Keep in mind the most fundamental theorem of computer science (with
Church Thesis): Universal machines exist. And that theorem is provable
in Robinson arithmetic (in a weak sense), and in Peano Arithmetic
(with a stringer sense).
What are the other consequences of the theory. Run me through them.
If it helps you to doubt a little bit of physicalism and
Aristotelianism, I am happy enough.
The consequence is more a state of mind, an awe in front of something
bigger that we thought (the internal view of arithmetic on itself).
An awe in front of our ignorance, but also the discovery that such
ignorance is structured, productive, inexhaustible.
So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most
rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer
reviewed enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some
people makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and
think, and special interests and all that, so I admit the results
are still rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by
them also, hard to say).
No that's not right. There are huge chains of unrefuted logic out
there. People don't sign up to those chains, they sign up to what
they accept. Scientists might reject comp if they hear what you've
got to say. A large number would not find that you sought to
dominate their options in comp very scientific.
The problem here Bruno, is you act like they have responsibility to
automatelly go into that process with you, or they are in a position
in which they assume comp, and now they have to find a fault in your
reasoning, or they automatically assume UDA.
Why not?
Once a mathematician proves that there are irrational numbers, no one
will come back with a theory claiming that does not exist, or claiming
that 2x^2 = y^2 has non trivial integer solution.
Computer science is a branch of mathematics. Everyone can verify what
I say. That is science: people must follow, or explain where there is
a flaw. The only opposition of some scientists was that my work was
too much easy, like their two years old niece could find herself. I
agree, but then she should publish.
Of course the subject makes easy to just ignore all this, because
during all the years of research, I was confronted with scientists
just dislilink the fundamental question, but also the quantum computer
science, ... That is common with *some* (not all of course) among the
so called "pure mathematicians" which just hates applications (and
logic was considered as a branch of pure mathematics by some logicians
who just hated computers).
Of course, I expect you study the reasoning get the *theorem", and so
we can move on.
This isn't what happens. No one has give a reason or is obliged to
extend what they believe to include your theory.
This means that you think there is a flaw. But you can't argue at a
meta-level on philosophical interpretation of the results. That is
indeed why I decide to make this public only when I can show a clear
means to test it.
The scientists who study it are right: it is simple. And it is not
more unbelievable than the quantum, or than Plato.
People don't accept things that other people think there's a logical
necessity or that they make a logical flow.
In computer science, even when applied to another domain, we do that.
You realize you are also saying that scientists all accept MWI.
They accepts that comp implies the many dreams.
Then, but this is another topic, I agree with Deutsch that the SWE
implies the MWI.
Indeed the SWE implies so much the MWI that the founders felt obliged
to add a selection axiom to avoid it, but then introduce a duality
between the observed and the observer, and they limit the range of the
SWE.
I give a mathematical definition of (QM) world (set of events closed
for interactions) and that QM implies the many worlds is simply
provable in reasonable axiomatization of QM.
But for the many dreams, it is directly a theorem of arithmetic that
all finite pieces of computations exist (and even the infinite
computations, in some sense), and by comp, those are not zombies.
Of course, when we apply a theory to reality, you can always use a
last selection principle (like Omnès), or any God of the gap. But step
8 of the UDA makes that precise, you really have to introduce a "new
mystery" to avoid the simple formulation of a problem in a simpler
theory.
You could swing from QM or from comp here. And the blocktime idea.
And a lot else.
Yes, galileo, Einstein, Gödel (in physics!), Everett, and comp go in
the direction of coming back to Kant and Plato, the categories of
space/time/energy belongs to the category of math/arithmetic/machine-
thoughts.
It's pretty clear these aren't true statements. Scientists don't all
believe in MWI;. Or Blocktime.
That is never an argument. We don't vote in science, we prove, and
most of the time we are wrong, but we never don't claim something
being wrong without showing it.
They aren't obliged to consider those theories. s Ne a
Nobody needs to believe in comp. I never said that I believe in comp.
I just find it leading to a quite elegant scheme of theory of
everything (the universal Turing machine, elementary arithmetic, ...),
and I show it put some doubt on the Aristotle view of reality
(physicalism/materialism).
Physics is not shown wrong (like I heard sometimes), but physicalism,
or metaphysical naturalism, is shown incompatible with
computationalism.
The so-called radicality of what I say is in the mind of those who
thought that science has solved all problem, and that it has notably
decided between Plato and Aristotle (almost the genuine difference
believer/non-believer), and that comp explains the mind and its
relation with matter.
Science is methodological...it's a new kind of philosophy.
I agree. I believe only in scientific attitude. Some scientists have
that attitude in their field, but lost it when talking in the
colleague's field.
It can't be encapsulated or even defined in philosophy.
Perhaps. But that very fact might be explained in some theory of
science.
We can always try theories. Or derive some theories from some
fundamental principle (like comp).
Because science evolved out of that, in the same way philosophy
evolved out of something, and that something cannot define
philosophy, and philosophy cannot define science.
You are quick. That depends a lot of the fundamental assumption you
are willing to assume to define or meta-define those terms. We can
also make approximations, or use semi-axiomatic theories.
In particular, we can study the difference between computer science
and computer's computer science, which provides way to handle some
philosophical questions. (Even without comp, as a means to show some
argument being non valid).
I don't think science has solved all problem, but I don't think non-
scientific fields have solved pretty much any problem.
OK.
Science has solved more in tiniest pinky fingernail than all of
them combined 10 times over. It's that vast difference that doesn't
get explained by stories about science as just a bit more
philosophy, all about popper or all about Aristotle.
I can argue that we do science all the time, from inferring we have
hands and mothers when baby, to questioning the afterlife.
But the closer we get to the human fears and concerns, a lack of rigor
is tolerated as it suits those who make money with fears and human
concerns.
That is why I am pleased to illustrate that we can do theology with
the scientific method. We need just to be clear on the assumptions,
and the mean of reasoning, and the means of testing the theory.
I don't find any theory that sits on philosophical ideas about
science very radical. I find you quite radical though.
Comp is radical. thought experience can help to understand that it
makes you independent of your body (you can change your body every
morning), and then (UDA), it makes the neighborhood immaterial, and
non Turing emulable a priori, and obeying laws that we can test.
I have no theory. Just a theorem. A subtle one, sure, which makes
mathematical sense only thanks to Church thesis and the closure of
arithmetic for diagonalization.
I show that this is not true, and that if we can accept that comp
and computer science does indeed explain a large part of the mind,
including knowledge and perhaps consciousness, it can only succeed
on this if it explains the observable by a complex sum on all
computations seen from the possible machine's points of view. (and
that can be handled mathematically if we accept some definitions).
What I'd say is, don't worry about persuading people. Do the work,
get the breakthrough that make those people have to come to you.
You're not as old as I thought you'd said you were...you don't look
beyond 40 or so or maybe a bit more. But whatever, you look youthful
and like you've got several more decades in the mortal coal, touch
wood.
I am 58, and the "UDA-like" breakthrough was made when I was a kid.
Then the "AUDA-like" breakthrough was when I read Gödel 1931. The rest
is work. It is done. The progress made is the discovery of the
Plotinus lexicon, the solving of a conjecture, + a fail attempt to
derive space from a quasi Temperley-Lieb in the graded comp-QL of Z1*
and X1*.
(You might read the Amoeba's secret, translated by Russell Standish
and Kim Jones, which sum up the development of the PhD thesis. I have
been asked to describe the moral harassment I did endure, as it is a
real plea in our societies. It is on Amazon.com)
The main weakness of this approach is that it leads quickly to complex
math. It is for the next generation. Today, the experts in G and G*
are in Georgia (Europa), and Russia, but they flew away a bit
everywhere.
The last discovery for me is that salvia might help some people to get
for the first time the ability to clearly conceive that the physical
reality might be indeed a shadow, or a border of something else. But
normally dreams, video games, imagination, or what you need to
understand the plot of some movies or games should be enough. It is
just that salvia might be very efficacious, to rise the doubt needed
to better appreciate the theorem and its application in (machine's)
theology. And most people do not appreciate, as I have discovered. It
is normal, but it would be like taking comp too much seriously to not
dare thinking about the type of theological realities it implies.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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