On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote:
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> On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
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> There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the
> key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating
> that for me, the salient point about the article was that the
> distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they
> closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around
> 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth
>
>
> Nice.
>
Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like "yeah mother fucker I'm
with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread!"
Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it.
What about the issue itself though?
> It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the
> case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position.
> When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp
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> Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you
> will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist "Jacques
> Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He
> wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp) book on this. But even among
> the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view.
>
> Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which
> cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the
> right level.
>
Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is
can replace < organA >with <majorRevolutioninFieldA> + <majorRevoltion in
field B>....+..+...<major revolution in field N>
One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that
differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of
computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience
consciousness in my head, why not my liver?
>
> Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the
> premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a
> designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact
> that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the
> solution of the diophantine equations.>
>
So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because
there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at
some point involving god and something else?
This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus
composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them
would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that.
Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't
mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at
no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in
terms of comp at all.
What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds,
has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way
now from they believe in comp.
I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And
the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels
someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a
zebra?
Or do I miss the point?
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> and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp,
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> What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a
> problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?
>
Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things?
Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me?
What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is
that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless
they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this:
Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com --> brunos's
UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows
--> MWI follows
--> Infinite dreams follows
* So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI?
> Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually,
> but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged
> that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1-views (like John Clark).
> In brussels, they have invoked a philosopher who judged the thesis not
> receivable (which means not even a private defense: they have never heard
> me, even in private) from his personal conviction (and later invoke the
> "free-exam" principle for that, like if the free-exam is the right for
> professor to give bad note to student without questioning them).
>
> So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most
> rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed
> enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people makes
> ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and special
> interests and all that, so I admit the results are still rather ignored,
> though some people seems to be inspired by them also, hard to say).
>
> The so-called radicality of what I say is in the mind of those who thought
> that science has solved all problem, and that it has notably decided
> between Plato and Aristotle (almost the genuine difference
> believer/non-believer), and that comp explains the mind and its relation
> with matter.
>
> I show that this is not true, and that if we can accept that comp and
> computer science does indeed explain a large part of the mind, including
> knowledge and perhaps consciousness, it can only succeed on this if it
> explains the observable by a complex sum on all computations seen from the
> possible machine's points of view. (and that can be handled mathematically
> if we accept some definitions).
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> you are the one's being less than honest, intellectually. Not me.
>
>
> I disagree, because you insinuate that there is a problem without showing
> one, besides the fact that y
> ...
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