On 12 June 2014 08:26, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote: > Similarly the mentioned "qualia" are humanly approvable, > anthropocetric/morphic distortions for "whoknowswhat". >
Are we in the vicinity of Kant's phenomenal world here? > You ask: why gravity? because that was an observation (and name) of Newton. > Curious comment. Newton observed a regularity in nature, but that isn't an answer to "why gravity?" - gravity existed before Newton did. > Why spacetime? because Einstein said so. > There was lots of evidence for space-time before Einstein said so. Mercury, Michelson and Morley (and that's just the 'M's :) > Maybe YOUR universal machine knows more - why? because you said so. > You seem to be indicating that we're making up the universe as we go along. I wonder if the universe would agree with you. > Justifications, evidences are figments somebody found fittable. > The reason I write this is my plea for more humbleness in 'sciences'. > Somebody should get an award for NOT KNOWING. > The "Wittgenstein award for constructive silence", perhaps. > > Agnostically yours > > John M > > > > On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> I (re)comment Brent, on this crucial topic, when tackling the mind-body >> problem, or the consciousness/matter problem. >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2014, at 01:22, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 10 June 2014 21:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> I would argue that, at the ontological level, the explanation *does >>>> indeed* >>>> make heat, or temperature, "illusory". The whole point of the reduction >>>> is >>>> to show that there could not, in principle, be any supernumerary >>>> something >>>> left unaccounted for by an explanation couched exclusively at the >>>> "primordial" level, whatever one takes that to be. Given that this is >>>> the >>>> specific goal of explanatory reduction, what we have here is a precise >>>> dis-analogy, in that there *is indeed* a disturbingly irreducible >>>> something >>>> left behind, or unaccounted for, in the case of consciousness: i.e. the >>>> 1p >>>> experience itself. >>>> >>> >> That is the key point. I guess written by David (and what follows just >> below is Brent's answer, and then David's reply). >> As we have discussed this before, if competence can be reduced to >> computer programs in a similar way that temperature can be reduced to >> molecules kinetic, the analogy does not work for consciousness, or at least >> not completely. >> In fact it is here that the theaetetus idea get the morst effective, as >> it will explain that the analogy is wrong. If it was true, consciousness >> would be a 3p notion (both kinetic and temperature are 3p observable), but >> by showing that the [] and ([]p & p) obey different logics, despite proving >> the same 3p sentences p (something unbelievable for the machine) it >> justifies a distinct apprehension of a same truth from the different points >> of view existing for the machines. >> >> >> >> (Brent: >>>> You're simply assuming it's unaccounted for. The hypothesis was that >>>> there >>>> might be a theory which was successful in "reading minds" and >>>> "predicting >>>> thoughts" based on physical observation of a brain. >>>> >>> >> Not at all. Predicting is not explaining. Explaining is more in >> reducing-without-eliminating. >> >> >> >> Brent: >>>> >>> >> I'd say that is all >>>> that can be done; >>>> >>> >> I think we can do more. >> >> >> >> to ask for more is just anthropic prejudice about what an >>>> explanation should look like - it's like asking, "But why does gravity >>>> want >>>> to pull things together?" >>>> >>> >> Yes, why? :) >> >> And why gravity at all? >> >> I give you the reason, roughly: it is a consequence of the theory of >> simple groups. They encapsulate the diverse symmetries (made necessary by >> the "p->[]<>p" laws). >> >> Ah! The number 24 has also some role in there, I feel so. >> >> Sorry David. below you make well the point, I think. >> >> >>> But I strenuously reject that this is a gratuitous assumption in >>> context. In fact, you appeal to the same assumption in your statements >>> above. You hypothesise a theory capable of describing and predicting >>> mental states entirely on the basis of their correlative 3p phenomena. >>> Any such reduction cannot, even (or especially) in principle, say >>> anything distinctive about the mental states themselves - the 1p side >>> of the correlation. In the very enterprise of reducing them to purely >>> 3p terms, *without loss*, it renders itself constitutively incapable >>> of accounting for them as distinctively irreducible phenomena in their >>> own right and in their own terms. But then the claim that it is >>> unreasonable or meaningless to enquire beyond this point, rather than >>> erecting some absolute barrier, is in practice a constraint of the >>> particular metaphysical posits one has chosen to work within. >>> >> >> Can't agree more. >> >> >> >> >>> By contrast, there is no need to grant the phenomena of temperature or >>>> heat >>>> any such supernumerary reality. >>>> >>>> Grant? There's no need to grant anything "reality". It's sort of an >>>> honorific we give to theories we believe (or at least seriously >>>> entertain). >>>> >>> >>> I wouldn't get hung up on any particular language here. I simply meant >>> that nobody needs, or would seek, to suppose that it is "like >>> anything" for a system to be at a particular temperature, to put it >>> baldly. Temperature is ultimately an explanatory device, albeit a >>> precise, pervasive and extremely useful one. By contrast, only those >>> on an eliminativist track would seek to deny that it is irreducibly >>> "like something" for a system to be in a conscious state. >>> Consequently, in the last resort, we could in principle dispense >>> altogether with any appeal to the phenomenon of temperature and >>> nothing essential would change. Temperature is straightforwardly >>> reducible to its constituent parts *without loss*. It is at this point >>> that any analogy with consciousness runs out of road. >>> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >>> Primordial matter, as it were, in its >>>> doings, need take no account of such intermediate levels, which, by >>>> assumption, reduce without loss to some exhaustive set of primordial >>>> entities and relations. >>>> >>>> That sounds very anthropomorphic and psychological - as though >>>> primordial >>>> matter was Mother Nature and took account or ignored things. In a >>>> straight >>>> forward mathematical description you can look at a certain integral and >>>> say, >>>> "That's the temperature." and there isn't any formulation in which such >>>> a >>>> value does not appear, it's a necessary aspect. >>>> >>> >>> I have tried to be clear as possible that I am specifically *not* >>> focusing on modes of explanation here: it's accepted that temperature >>> is a well-defined and useful explanatory device. My point was >>> specifically that we do not have to assume that any such intermediate >>> explanatory level is in any way relevant to the operation of its >>> (assumed) ontological reduction. In that very specific sense there is >>> indeed (at least in principle, which is what we are considering here) >>> a "formulation in which such a value does not appear", and this >>> without loss to that operation, or indeed any other consideration, >>> explanation excepted. >>> >>> The distinctive difference between temperature and consciousness is >>> then that, although (by assumption) an analogous 3p reduction can in >>> principle be performed, one can no longer say that this is *without >>> loss*. >>> >> >> That would indeed reduce the machine/person to the machine's body. (The >> body is the 3p self). >> >> The body is the Gödel number with respect to some universal number >> neihbors. >> >> >> >> I seem to be repeating myself here. >>> >> >> Terrestrial destiny. >> In "The hunting of the Snark", you need to repeat it only three times! :) >> >> >> >> But to reiterate once more, >>> if we are tempted to see this as a sign that the search for further >>> explanation is futile, we should first reflect whether we have hit the >>> buffers of a particular explanatory strategy, rather than the limits >>> of explanation tout court. >>> >> >> Well said. >> >> >> >>> The problem is that, in the final analysis - and it >>>> is precisely the *final* analysis that we are considering here - such >>>> theories need take no account of any intermediate level of explanation >>>> in >>>> order to qualify as "theories of everything", since any phenomenon >>>> whatsoever, on this species of fundamental accounting, can always be >>>> reduced >>>> without loss to the basic physical activity of the system in question. >>>> >>>> Or in Bruno's theory, to the basic arithmetical relations. >>>> >>> >>> Sure, but I don't know why you are ignoring the specific remarks that >>> I made about this very point. I took pains to explain that it used to >>> trouble me, as you say above, that the same reduction/elimination >>> critique could be applied to arithmetical relations. I think somebody >>> once called this "nothing butting". But on further consideration it >>> now seems to me that there could be a distinctive and potentially >>> game-changing difference. That is, the emulation of computation and >>> hence the universal machine in arithmetic could motivate the missing >>> relation to a distinctively "supernumerary" domain - the modes of >>> arithmetical truth - that is both irreducible to its base and >>> (possibly) demonstrably coterminous with the specifics of 1p >>> phenomena. >>> >> >> Exactly. >> >> And then by "computer science", we can study what ideally correct machine >> can prove about herself, in the 3p way, and study from outside the field of >> the machines' body the first person can identify with, and those are >> different mathematical structures. >> >> The main variants are: >> >> p >> []p >> []p & p >> []p & <>t >> []p & <>p & p >> >> And this restricted on the sigma_1 sentences, with or without oracles. >> >> It is the incompleteness theorems which makes this nuances making >> arithmetical sense (at least). >> >> Three among them splits on the truth/provable-by-the-machine distinction, >> which provides for the quanta and qualia distinction. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Of course I claim no technical competence in any such demonstration. >>> But I can see at least the outline of a re-contextualisation that >>> might permit the extrapolation of explanation beyond what may well >>> appear, under different assumptions, as some sort of absolute limit. >>> >> >> Absolutely. >> >> I can understand the instinct again the notion of "first person", as its >> invocation *in* science is automatically authoritarian, but this does not >> mean it does not exist, nor that it can't be derived from reasonable >> assumption. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> David >>> >>> >>>> >>> On 6/10/2014 4:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>> On 10 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> They're "along for the ride" like temperature is alftr on the kinetic >>>>> energy of molecules. Before stat mech, heat was regarded as an >>>>> immaterial >>>>> substance. It was explained by the motion of molecules; something >>>>> that is >>>>> 3p observable but the explanation didn't make it vanish or make it >>>>> illusory. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I would argue that, at the ontological level, the explanation *does >>>> indeed* >>>> make heat, or temperature, "illusory". The whole point of the reduction >>>> is >>>> to show that there could not, in principle, be any supernumerary >>>> something >>>> left unaccounted for by an explanation couched exclusively at the >>>> "primordial" level, whatever one takes that to be. Given that this is >>>> the >>>> specific goal of explanatory reduction, what we have here is a precise >>>> dis-analogy, in that there *is indeed* a disturbingly irreducible >>>> something >>>> left behind, or unaccounted for, in the case of consciousness: i.e. the >>>> 1p >>>> experience itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> You're simply assuming it's unaccounted for. The hypothesis was that >>>> there >>>> might be a theory which was successful in "reading minds" and >>>> "predicting >>>> thoughts" based on physical observation of a brain. I'd say that is all >>>> that can be done; to ask for more is just anthropic prejudice about >>>> what an >>>> explanation should look like - it's like asking, "But why does gravity >>>> want >>>> to pull things together?" >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> By contrast, there is no need to grant the phenomena of temperature or >>>> heat >>>> any such supernumerary reality. >>>> >>>> >>>> Grant? There's no need to grant anything "reality". It's sort of an >>>> honorific we give to theories we believe (or at least seriously >>>> entertain). >>>> >>>> >>>> One could indeed argue with some force that all such phenomena are >>>> themselves, in fine, specific artefacts, or useful fictions, of >>>> consciousness. That is, they are epistemologically or explanatorily, as >>>> distinct from ontologically, relevant. Primordial matter, as it were, >>>> in its >>>> doings, need take no account of such intermediate levels, which, by >>>> assumption, reduce without loss to some exhaustive set of primordial >>>> entities and relations. >>>> >>>> That sounds very anthropomorphic and psychological - as though >>>> primordial >>>> matter was Mother Nature and took account or ignored things. In a >>>> straight >>>> forward mathematical description you can look at a certain integral and >>>> say, >>>> "That's the temperature." and there isn't any formulation in which such >>>> a >>>> value does not appear, it's a necessary aspect. >>>> >>>> This was the entire point of the argument (focused on steps 7 and 8 of >>>> the >>>> UDA) that Liz excerpted: that there is a reduction/elimination impasse >>>> that >>>> needs somehow to be bridged by any theory seeking to reconcile >>>> consciousness >>>> and any primordial substratum (or, pace Bruno, hypostase) with which it >>>> is >>>> supposed to be correlated. And hence we have an unavoidable problem, up >>>> to >>>> this point, with theories based on "primordially-explanatory" material >>>> entities and processes. The problem is that, in the final analysis - >>>> and it >>>> is precisely the *final* analysis that we are considering here - such >>>> theories need take no account of any intermediate level of explanation >>>> in >>>> order to qualify as "theories of everything", since any phenomenon >>>> whatsoever, on this species of fundamental accounting, can always be >>>> reduced >>>> without loss to the basic physical activity of the system in question. >>>> >>>> >>>> Or in Bruno's theory, to the basic arithmetical relations. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> "In the first sense, to be a realist about quantum mechanics is simply >>>> to >>>> think that we should believe in the entities and structures that >>>> subserve >>>> its explanatory hypotheses. Put simply, belief goes along with >>>> explanatory >>>> success. And must be tempered by explanatory failure." >>>> --- Adrian Heathcote, Quantum Heterodxy, Science and Education, April, >>>> 2003. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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