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It was right under my nose. I just did not think abut it.
Thanx.On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 7:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 14 Jun 2014, at 17:55, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno: my software reproduced none of the proposed parts of that "square". > > > You cannot do the left and right hooks [ and ] ? > Normally those are standard, and done with the parenthesis key, + some > other keys. > Then the box is the concatenation of [ and ]. That gives [], which as > symbol seems more solid in mails than some more special one. > > > > Maybe your French base does it? I am on USA-English > > and have Hungarian > as 2nd installed. (Or Microsoft is the culprit not liking 'square' ones?) > > > > If you are using Microsoft I am afraid I can't help you! > > Bruno > > > > > > John > > > On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 4:26 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Dear Bruno, I find it beyond my aging capabilities to respond in all >> details to this long and diversed deluge of posts, also I have no learned >> basis to evaluate YOUR profession with those 'squares' for p etc. (btw HOW >> does your computer produce those squares?) >> so I reflect to the title: "... any POSSIBLE T O E" . We talked about >> 'our' (not identical) agnosticism and in 'mine' a TOE is impossible for us, >> humans at the level of foreseeable development our mind(?) reached so far. >> We may cover a restricted (reduced?) TOE comprising the portion we so far >> adjusted to our mental capbilities. >> Considering the unfathomable mass of 'observations' we received over the >> past millennia (not that we understood them - even as qualia accessible to >> us at times) >> your position echoes in my mind as saying: we choose the most likely and >> this is a good basis for "science" (truth?) to proceed upon them. >> Well, it is not for me. I rather claim "I dunno" and disclaim my Nobel >> prize. >> TOE is bound to Everything, not the inventory-content of our books. >> Similarly the mentioned "qualia" are humanly approvable, >> anthropocetric/morphic distortions for "whoknowswhat". >> You ask: why gravity? because that was an observation (and name) of >> Newton. >> Why spacetime? because Einstein said so. >> Maybe YOUR universal machine knows more - why? because you said so. >> Justifications, evidences are figments somebody found fittable. >> The reason I write this is my plea for more humbleness in 'sciences'. >> Somebody should get an award for NOT KNOWING. >> >> Agnostically yours >> >> John M >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> I (re)comment Brent, on this crucial topic, when tackling the mind-body >>> problem, or the consciousness/matter problem. >>> >>> >>> On 11 Jun 2014, at 01:22, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 10 June 2014 21:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> I would argue that, at the ontological level, the explanation *does >>>>> indeed* >>>>> make heat, or temperature, "illusory". The whole point of the >>>>> reduction is >>>>> to show that there could not, in principle, be any supernumerary >>>>> something >>>>> left unaccounted for by an explanation couched exclusively at the >>>>> "primordial" level, whatever one takes that to be. Given that this is >>>>> the >>>>> specific goal of explanatory reduction, what we have here is a precise >>>>> dis-analogy, in that there *is indeed* a disturbingly irreducible >>>>> something >>>>> left behind, or unaccounted for, in the case of consciousness: i.e. >>>>> the 1p >>>>> experience itself. >>>>> >>>> >>> That is the key point. I guess written by David (and what follows just >>> below is Brent's answer, and then David's reply). >>> As we have discussed this before, if competence can be reduced to >>> computer programs in a similar way that temperature can be reduced to >>> molecules kinetic, the analogy does not work for consciousness, or at least >>> not completely. >>> In fact it is here that the theaetetus idea get the morst effective, as >>> it will explain that the analogy is wrong. If it was true, consciousness >>> would be a 3p notion (both kinetic and temperature are 3p observable), but >>> by showing that the [] and ([]p & p) obey different logics, despite proving >>> the same 3p sentences p (something unbelievable for the machine) it >>> justifies a distinct apprehension of a same truth from the different points >>> of view existing for the machines. >>> >>> >>> >>> (Brent: >>>>> You're simply assuming it's unaccounted for. The hypothesis was that >>>>> there >>>>> might be a theory which was successful in "reading minds" and >>>>> "predicting >>>>> thoughts" based on physical observation of a brain. >>>>> >>>> >>> Not at all. Predicting is not explaining. Explaining is more in >>> reducing-without-eliminating. >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent: >>>>> >>>> >>> I'd say that is all >>>>> that can be done; >>>>> >>>> >>> I think we can do more. >>> >>> >>> >>> to ask for more is just anthropic prejudice about what an >>>>> explanation should look like - it's like asking, "But why does gravity >>>>> want >>>>> to pull things together?" >>>>> >>>> >>> Yes, why? :) >>> >>> And why gravity at all? >>> >>> I give you the reason, roughly: it is a consequence of the theory of >>> simple groups. They encapsulate the diverse symmetries (made necessary by >>> the "p->[]<>p" laws). >>> >>> Ah! The number 24 has also some role in there, I feel so. >>> >>> Sorry David. below you make well the point, I think. >>> >>> >>>> But I strenuously reject that this is a gratuitous assumption in >>>> context. In fact, you appeal to the same assumption in your statements >>>> above. You hypothesise a theory capable of describing and predicting >>>> mental states entirely on the basis of their correlative 3p phenomena. >>>> Any such reduction cannot, even (or especially) in principle, say >>>> anything distinctive about the mental states themselves - the 1p side >>>> of the correlation. In the very enterprise of reducing them to purely >>>> 3p terms, *without loss*, it renders itself constitutively incapable >>>> of accounting for them as distinctively irreducible phenomena in their >>>> own right and in their own terms. But then the claim that it is >>>> unreasonable or meaningless to enquire beyond this point, rather than >>>> erecting some absolute barrier, is in practice a constraint of the >>>> particular metaphysical posits one has chosen to work within. >>>> >>> >>> Can't agree more. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> By contrast, there is no need to grant the phenomena of temperature or >>>>> heat >>>>> any such supernumerary reality. >>>>> >>>>> Grant? There's no need to grant anything "reality". It's sort of an >>>>> honorific we give to theories we believe (or at least seriously >>>>> entertain). >>>>> >>>> >>>> I wouldn't get hung up on any particular language here. I simply meant >>>> that nobody needs, or would seek, to suppose that it is "like >>>> anything" for a system to be at a particular temperature, to put it >>>> baldly. Temperature is ultimately an explanatory device, albeit a >>>> precise, pervasive and extremely useful one. By contrast, only those >>>> on an eliminativist track would seek to deny that it is irreducibly >>>> "like something" for a system to be in a conscious state. >>>> Consequently, in the last resort, we could in principle dispense >>>> altogether with any appeal to the phenomenon of temperature and >>>> nothing essential would change. Temperature is straightforwardly >>>> reducible to its constituent parts *without loss*. It is at this point >>>> that any analogy with consciousness runs out of road. >>>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Primordial matter, as it were, in its >>>>> doings, need take no account of such intermediate levels, which, by >>>>> assumption, reduce without loss to some exhaustive set of primordial >>>>> entities and relations. >>>>> >>>>> That sounds very anthropomorphic and psychological - as though >>>>> primordial >>>>> matter was Mother Nature and took account or ignored things. In a >>>>> straight >>>>> forward mathematical description you can look at a certain integral >>>>> and say, >>>>> "That's the temperature." and there isn't any formulation in which >>>>> such a >>>>> value does not appear, it's a necessary aspect. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I have tried to be clear as possible that I am specifically *not* >>>> focusing on modes of explanation here: it's accepted that temperature >>>> is a well-defined and useful explanatory device. My point was >>>> specifically that we do not have to assume that any such intermediate >>>> explanatory level is in any way relevant to the operation of its >>>> (assumed) ontological reduction. In that very specific sense there is >>>> indeed (at least in principle, which is what we are considering here) >>>> a "formulation in which such a value does not appear", and this >>>> without loss to that operation, or indeed any other consideration, >>>> explanation excepted. >>>> >>>> The distinctive difference between temperature and consciousness is >>>> then that, although (by assumption) an analogous 3p reduction can in >>>> principle be performed, one can no longer say that this is *without >>>> loss*. >>>> >>> >>> That would indeed reduce the machine/person to the machine's body. (The >>> body is the 3p self). >>> >>> The body is the Gödel number with respect to some universal number >>> neihbors. >>> >>> >>> >>> I seem to be repeating myself here. >>>> >>> >>> Terrestrial destiny. >>> In "The hunting of the Snark", you need to repeat it only three times! :) >>> >>> >>> >>> But to reiterate once more, >>>> if we are tempted to see this as a sign that the search for further >>>> explanation is futile, we should first reflect whether we have hit the >>>> buffers of a particular explanatory strategy, rather than the limits >>>> of explanation tout court. >>>> >>> >>> Well said. >>> >>> >>> >>>> The problem is that, in the final analysis - and it >>>>> is precisely the *final* analysis that we are considering here - such >>>>> theories need take no account of any intermediate level of explanation >>>>> in >>>>> order to qualify as "theories of everything", since any phenomenon >>>>> whatsoever, on this species of fundamental accounting, can always be >>>>> reduced >>>>> without loss to the basic physical activity of the system in question. >>>>> >>>>> Or in Bruno's theory, to the basic arithmetical relations. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Sure, but I don't know why you are ignoring the specific remarks that >>>> I made about this very point. I took pains to explain that it used to >>>> trouble me, as you say above, that the same reduction/elimination >>>> critique could be applied to arithmetical relations. I think somebody >>>> once called this "nothing butting". But on further consideration it >>>> now seems to me that there could be a distinctive and potentially >>>> game-changing difference. That is, the emulation of computation and >>>> hence the universal machine in arithmetic could motivate the missing >>>> relation to a distinctively "supernumerary" domain - the modes of >>>> arithmetical truth - that is both irreducible to its base and >>>> (possibly) demonstrably coterminous with the specifics of 1p >>>> phenomena. >>>> >>> >>> Exactly. >>> >>> And then by "computer science", we can study what ideally correct >>> machine can prove about herself, in the 3p way, and study from outside the >>> field of the machines' body the first person can identify with, and those >>> are different mathematical structures. >>> >>> The main variants are: >>> >>> p >>> []p >>> []p & p >>> []p & <>t >>> []p & <>p & p >>> >>> And this restricted on the sigma_1 sentences, with or without oracles. >>> >>> It is the incompleteness theorems which makes this nuances making >>> arithmetical sense (at least). >>> >>> Three among them splits on the truth/provable-by-the-machine >>> distinction, which provides for the quanta and qualia distinction. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Of course I claim no technical competence in any such demonstration. >>>> But I can see at least the outline of a re-contextualisation that >>>> might permit the extrapolation of explanation beyond what may well >>>> appear, under different assumptions, as some sort of absolute limit. >>>> >>> >>> Absolutely. >>> >>> I can understand the instinct again the notion of "first person", as its >>> invocation *in* science is automatically authoritarian, but this does not >>> mean it does not exist, nor that it can't be derived from reasonable >>> assumption. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>> On 6/10/2014 4:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 10 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> They're "along for the ride" like temperature is alftr on the kinetic >>>>>> energy of molecules. Before stat mech, heat was regarded as an >>>>>> immaterial >>>>>> substance. It was explained by the motion of molecules; something >>>>>> that is >>>>>> 3p observable but the explanation didn't make it vanish or make it >>>>>> illusory. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I would argue that, at the ontological level, the explanation *does >>>>> indeed* >>>>> make heat, or temperature, "illusory". The whole point of the >>>>> reduction is >>>>> to show that there could not, in principle, be any supernumerary >>>>> something >>>>> left unaccounted for by an explanation couched exclusively at the >>>>> "primordial" level, whatever one takes that to be. Given that this is >>>>> the >>>>> specific goal of explanatory reduction, what we have here is a precise >>>>> dis-analogy, in that there *is indeed* a disturbingly irreducible >>>>> something >>>>> left behind, or unaccounted for, in the case of consciousness: i.e. >>>>> the 1p >>>>> experience itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You're simply assuming it's unaccounted for. The hypothesis was that >>>>> there >>>>> might be a theory which was successful in "reading minds" and >>>>> "predicting >>>>> thoughts" based on physical observation of a brain. I'd say that is >>>>> all >>>>> that can be done; to ask for more is just anthropic prejudice about >>>>> what an >>>>> explanation should look like - it's like asking, "But why does gravity >>>>> want >>>>> to pull things together?" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By contrast, there is no need to grant the phenomena of temperature or >>>>> heat >>>>> any such supernumerary reality. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Grant? There's no need to grant anything "reality". It's sort of an >>>>> honorific we give to theories we believe (or at least seriously >>>>> entertain). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> One could indeed argue with some force that all such phenomena are >>>>> themselves, in fine, specific artefacts, or useful fictions, of >>>>> consciousness. That is, they are epistemologically or explanatorily, as >>>>> distinct from ontologically, relevant. Primordial matter, as it were, >>>>> in its >>>>> doings, need take no account of such intermediate levels, which, by >>>>> assumption, reduce without loss to some exhaustive set of primordial >>>>> entities and relations. >>>>> >>>>> That sounds very anthropomorphic and psychological - as though >>>>> primordial >>>>> matter was Mother Nature and took account or ignored things. In a >>>>> straight >>>>> forward mathematical description you can look at a certain integral >>>>> and say, >>>>> "That's the temperature." and there isn't any formulation in which >>>>> such a >>>>> value does not appear, it's a necessary aspect. >>>>> >>>>> This was the entire point of the argument (focused on steps 7 and 8 of >>>>> the >>>>> UDA) that Liz excerpted: that there is a reduction/elimination impasse >>>>> that >>>>> needs somehow to be bridged by any theory seeking to reconcile >>>>> consciousness >>>>> and any primordial substratum (or, pace Bruno, hypostase) with which >>>>> it is >>>>> supposed to be correlated. And hence we have an unavoidable problem, >>>>> up to >>>>> this point, with theories based on "primordially-explanatory" material >>>>> entities and processes. The problem is that, in the final analysis - >>>>> and it >>>>> is precisely the *final* analysis that we are considering here - such >>>>> theories need take no account of any intermediate level of explanation >>>>> in >>>>> order to qualify as "theories of everything", since any phenomenon >>>>> whatsoever, on this species of fundamental accounting, can always be >>>>> reduced >>>>> without loss to the basic physical activity of the system in question. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Or in Bruno's theory, to the basic arithmetical relations. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> "In the first sense, to be a realist about quantum mechanics is simply >>>>> to >>>>> think that we should believe in the entities and structures that >>>>> subserve >>>>> its explanatory hypotheses. Put simply, belief goes along with >>>>> explanatory >>>>> success. And must be tempered by explanatory failure." >>>>> --- Adrian Heathcote, Quantum Heterodxy, Science and Education, >>>>> April, >>>>> 2003. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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