On 13 Jun 2014, at 04:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/12/2014 7:03 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 June 2014 02:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Simply because you can give something you call a "basic
accounting" of a
painting by specifying the placement of pigments on a canvas doesn't
preclude also describing it as a Monet of water lillies. You've
chosen a
level and called it "basic" and then complain that it leaves
something out.
I'd say it's just incomplete.
You're right, it doesn't preclude it, but neither does it demand it.
The painting wouldn't be any the less what it is *physically* were it
to remain uninterpreted in perpetuity.
Yes it would. Physics is interaction - not just existence,
Physics talk only on many things, but a priori does not talk about
existence, unless you mean physicist physics.
and in fact QM teaches us that *things* don't exist without
interacting.
Like Mermin telling that today we know definitely that the moon does
not exist when we don't look at it?
It seems to me that this kind of weirdness exists only when we take QM
+collapse.
That's where I think Bruno's step 8 is misleading. If pursued
rigorously I think it would require a whole world to implement all
the counterfactuals.
I don't think so. You need only the computations, which defines all
the counterfactuals, and the logic of counterfactuals will be one (or
many) among the main arithmetical modalities (hypostases). Step 8 just
shows that making primitive matter genuinely necessary for
consciousness reintroduce a non turing emulable, nor FPI-recoverable
"magic" at the place where classical comp provides an experimental
tool to measure that magic (which means that comp is false, or we are
lied on the fundamental level (i.e. we are in an emulation done at a
low level, in "our" hidden normal reality level).
Physics just don't address the question of theology and metaphysics.
The problem is that there is a widespread confusion due to the fact
that many take physics for a theology, but that is physicalism. That
might be true, but comp illustrates this is not necessarily the case,
and evidences (from both the empirical reality, and the arithmetical
reality) adds that the fundamental"reality" might be not a physical
one. With comp, it has to be arithmetical from "outside/3p" and is
theological from inside, with the physical appearing to be the border
of the universal mind (of the universal machine). It is the place
where God loses control, and usually considered negatively by the
mystics (roots of suffering, illusion,
And if you only prove that an artificial consciousness can exist in
an artificial world you have proved much except that "artificial" is
relative.
How could a universal machine can do would make an "artificial
consciousness" emulated at the right level through the truth of
arithmetical relations (actually deductible from the addition and
multiplication axioms) wou
Step 8 extends that relativity on the set of true arithmetical
sentences.
You need consciousness to be physical in a non Turing emulable and non
FPI-recoverable sense to escape the conclusion.
Logically you can always add something like holy matter to escape the
conclusion, as step 8 cannot falsifies logically the "primitive
matter" (which is not logical indeed), but step 8 shows it to be
equivalent with "don't ask about consciousness".
The point is that the
"completion" (i.e. the interpretation of the pigments on canvas as a
particular work by Monet) is a supernumerary epistemological
consequence that is not required (in the strict terms of this view)
to
singularise or otherwise determine the physical state of affairs.
I think you are assuming the point in question, i.e. that all the
physical interactions of brains with the painting and the rest of
the world are irrelevant and that the "physical" description of the
painting is *just* the pigment on the canvas. You take all that
other interaction, which also has both physical and psychological
description and leave it out and then you say the physical
description leaves out something essential. That seems to imply
that you believe philosophical zombies are possible?
It is just that if you need if the physical can bring all the relevant
descriptions, and that such description can be truncated digitally,
and that yet you still survived, then *you* have to believe in
infinitely many zombies in arithmetic.
If you were able to convince me of the existence of primitive matter
validly, there would be a local measure one (with respect to here and
now) of "Brent Meeker-zombies" in arithmetic convincing validly a
similar infinities of "Bruno-Marchal-zombies". I think that even a
zombie cannot make a valid deduction of something which we know (from
the very definition of arithmetic) that it is trivially false.
Comp *has* a notion of primitive matter (the sum on all computations
below the subst level, or []p & <>t with p sigma_1), but it is defined
as "observable by a universal machine".
As long as this fits with what we observe, it might be only redundant
to add a mysterious real primitive matter, but as long as we don't
know, why not test this.
This theory has a use: to doubt about the correct theology. You say
"physical truth". I say, we can test this in the usual sense of the
terms when assuming we are not in an emulation or dream, which is the
trivial level where theories are no more even refutable.
Bruno
Brent
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