On 14 Jun 2014, at 05:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/13/2014 5:45 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 June 2014 12:26, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/13/2014 4:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Consequently, neither computation, nor the epistemological states it
emulates, are dispensable (i.e. fully reducible) in this schema.
It's not clear what "emulates" means. I think Bruno proposes that
arithmetical computation actually instantiates modal states like
belief. But I think that may be stretching the meaning of
"belief". If belief is defined in terms of propensity to act
certain ways in certain contexts, then it seems it can be
physically instantiated too.
Yes, as a propensity to act in a certain way, a belief is
doubtless a complex data structure. (But if comp is correct it's a
finite one.)
Of course saying "physically instantiated" is assuming what you're
trying to prove.
Proof is for logicians and mathematicians who come armed with
assumptions they call "axioms".
That's right, which is why maths and logic appear to be the only
things we can know about for sure. The question is whether that has
any ontological implications. I don't know of any way to prove that
it does or doesn't, which is why I remain agnostic.
"Physically instantiated" isn't even a sentence, so you must be
referring to "If belief is defined in terms of
propensity to act certain ways in certain contexts, then it seems
it can be physically instantiated too." I don't think that's just
an assumption, it's an inductive inference given some ostensive
definitions.
Do you want me to wear my fingers out? Obviously I'm referring to
the quote immediately above, that's why it's there! Anyway, if
that's an inductive inference it appears to be one that assumes the
materialist position, unless you are being explicitly agnostic on
what "physically" means (but most people who use it like that
aren't, so I'd expect you to say so).
I thought I'd been pretty clear that it's ill defined, a point on
which I agree with Bruno. I tried to define it in the exchange with
David, but he seemed to reject my definition and just assumed
everybody knows what it means.
The materialist position is the starting point of comp, so it will
trip over the reversal unless you can point out where Bruno's gone
wrong.
I wrote several paragraphs on why I don't find Bruno's arguments
very persuasive.
It is a 99,9% deductive argument, but in step 8 we point to "reality",
in which case we need Occam razor to eliminate the non relevant
axioms. Step 8 shows that you have to build a very special magical
theory of primitive matter to escape the conclusion, or you compare
the classical comp with nature, and this might give you a clue for
that "experimental" theory of primitive matter.
My point is that we just don't know, today, but I give a way to test
this, and clues, that QM is going in the comp direction, even if we
might improve at some stage the knowledge theory.
Bruno
Brent
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