On 14 Jun 2014, at 01:46, LizR wrote:
On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/13/2014 2:22 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Moreover, it is not
straightforwardly reducible to the underlying arithmetical entities
and relations, because the selective principle in question *depends"
on complex, computationally-instantiated epistemological states
What's an epistemological state of an arithmetical entity? Sounds
like an egregious confusion of levels to me. :-)
Well, our knowledge is, if comp is correct! :-)
Yes.
It is not different from the epistemological state of a machine, or
better, of the person associated to the machine.
And with Theatetus applied to the arithmetical beweisbar predicate of
Gödel, we do obtain, thanks to incompleteness, the necessary nuances
to have first person person ([]p & p), and matter sharable first
person ([]p & <>p), although on p sigma_1, matter appears already in
the first person.
Those epistemological state does not apply to any arithmetical
entities, but provably to those who will have relative self-
referentially correct 3p discourse about themselves, including the 3p
description of the other discourses.
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
