On 31 July 2014 06:36, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> The MGA, in particular, is very subtle. I think I have now found a way > of coming to grips with it, and it is a little different to the usual > precis given here. Fundamentally, computational supervenience (which > requires counterfactual correctness, a factor often overlooked in the > summaries) is incompatible with physical supervenience, but only in a > single universe, not a multiverse. Since physical supervenience is > well supported empirically (something JC has banged on a bit about, as > well as Brent), the only way of rescuing computational supervenience > is to insist that we do, in fact, live in a multiverse. But that multiverse > entails the universal dovetailer, or at least enough of it to emulate > consciousness, which suffices to get the reversal result of step 7. > I always run aground on those counterfactuals - that is I can't see the point of them. I hope your coming paper will help me out! I look forward to it. :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
