On 31 July 2014 06:36, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> The MGA, in particular, is very subtle. I think I have now found a way > of coming to grips with it, and it is a little different to the usual > precis given here. Fundamentally, computational supervenience (which > requires counterfactual correctness, a factor often overlooked in the > summaries) is incompatible with physical supervenience, but only in a > single universe, not a multiverse. Since physical supervenience is > well supported empirically (something JC has banged on a bit about, as > well as Brent), the only way of rescuing computational supervenience > is to insist that we do, in fact, live in a multiverse. But that multiverse > entails the universal dovetailer, or at least enough of it to emulate > consciousness, which suffices to get the reversal result of step 7. > I always run aground on those counterfactuals - that is I can't see the point of them. I hope your coming paper will help me out! I look forward to it. :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
